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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

ROBERT BELTRAN and
DOROTHY DEE CARPENTER,

CaseNo.20010164-CA

Defendants/Appellants.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Defendants appeal their individual convictions for aggravated arson, a first degree
felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-103 (1999), entered as second degree felony
convictions pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-402 (1999). This Court has jurisdiction
pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (2002).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1. Did the trial court correctly deny defendants' motions to suppress evidence on the
ground that some items were in plain view and others were seized pursuant to a lawfully
issued search warrant which, when read with its accompanying affidavit, sufficiently
described the items to be seized?
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A bifurcated standard applies in reviewing a denial of a motion to suppress: the trial
court's factual findings are reviewed for clear error; its legal conclusions are reviewed for
correctness. State v. Fridleifson, 2002 UT App 322, \ 7, 57 P.3d 1098.
2. Have defendants established that the trial court plainly erred in the voir dire of four
jurors regarding their familial relationship with each other, their relatives' government
employment, and in one case, the juror's legal residence?
Because defendants did not challenge the four jurors and stipulated that the voir dire
was adequate, defendants must establish that (a) the trial court erred in conducting the voir
dire, (b) the error was obvious, (c) the error actually prejudiced the outcome of the trial, and
(d) defendants did not invite the error. See State v. Bloomfield,2003 UT App 3, f 7,63 P.3d
110 (reaffirming invited error limitation on plain error standard).
3. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying defendants' motion alleging juror
misconduct on the ground that the exchanges between two jurors and the prosecutor's wife
were, in one case, common courtesy and, in the other, about a community play and,
consequently, insufficient to justify a new trial?
A trial court's denial of a motion for new trial is reviewed for abuse of discretion, but
the legal standards applied by the court in reaching that determination are reviewed for
correctness. State v. Martin, 2002 UT 34, f 45, 44 P.3d 805.
4. Is the evidence sufficient to support defendants' convictions for aggravated arson?
Reversal is warranted only if the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable
to the verdict, is "sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds
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must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which
he or she was convicted." State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, f 18 (citation omitted).
STATUTES. RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Resolution of this appeal involves the following provisions, which are attached in
Addendum A, together with other provisions cited in the body of this brief:
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-103 (1999) - Aggravated Arson;
CODE ANN. §78-5-106 (2002) -Justice Court Judge Authority;
CODE ANN. § 78-7-17.5 (2002) - Authority of Magistrate;
UTAHR. CRIM. P. 18- Selection of Jury.
UTAH
UTAH

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant Carpenter owned the Frontier Barbecue Restaurant in Kanab, Utah, and
resided in the building's basement apartment (T 494: 204; T 497: 1022, 1103).' Her "best
friend," Defendant Beltran, worked as her cook and resided in a separate bedroom in the
apartment (T 497:1009,1013,1034-35,1103). On March 24,1998, afiredestroyed the roof
and attic of the building and damaged a bathroom on the main floor. On July 14, 1998,
defendants were charged with aggravated arson (BR 1-2; CR 1-2).2
Prior to trial, defendants moved to suppress a small piece of Sheetrock found in the
bed of Beltran's truck, photographs and a video of the burnt roof and attic, and fourteen items
seized from the restaurant and apartment pursuant to a search warrant (BR 92-99, 104-15;
1

Defendants were separately charged, but their cases joined for trial. Pleadings
Files No. 981600101 (Beltran) and No. 981600100 (Carpenter) are respectively
designated "BR" and "CR." Transcript citations are "T."
2

Aggravated arson is the intentional damaging of a habitable structure, that is, a
building used for lodging or business, by means of fire. See UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-6101(2) &-103(1 )(a) (1999).
:

3' ,-. .
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CR 101-04,112-27,155-56,164-66). Following an evidentiary hearing, defendants' motions
were granted in part and seven items suppressed as being outside the scope of the warrant
(BR 149-50; CR 196-97). At the same time, the motions were denied in part because two
items were in plain view from a position in the parking lot and the remaining seven items fell
within the parameters of the lawfully issued warrant (BR 166-75; CR 198,275-77,294-303).
Motions for reconsideration were also denied (BR 153-56; CR 278-81).
A jury trial commenced on June 19,2000 (BR 243-49; CR 416-21,394). Prospective
jurors were questioned (T 494: 11-163). All but one of the jurors challenged for cause by
defendants were excused (T 494:65,104,106-09,116,119-22,125,129,143,147,136,145,
148,153,154,156). Counsel stipulated to the qualifications of the remaining jurors (T 494:
119, 117-19, 147-48, 156-57). Defendants were granted six peremptory challenges, but
chose not to strike the jurors they now challenge (T 494: 157, 163).
Both parties presented multiple trial witnesses, including expert witnesses, and
introduced numerous exhibits. Defendant Beltran testified on his own behalf (T 497: 10081130; TR 499: 30-48, 177-85); Defendant Carpenter chose not to testify (T 499: 48). On
June 27, 2000, the jury convicted defendants of aggravated arson (BR 243; CR 394).
Defendants filed a motion for new trial claiming that one juror was not a qualified
resident and that two jurors improperly conversed with the prosecutor's wife during trial (BR
255-56, 272-77; CR 426-27, 439, 445-50). Following an evidentiary hearing, the court
denied the motion after finding the one juror was a Kane County resident and that the any
exchanges between the two jurors and the prosecutor's wife was brief and amounted to no
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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more than common courtesy or related only to a community play and, therefore, was
insufficient to justify a new trial (BR 280-83,289-93; CR 453-54,459-60,464-65,473-75).
Defendants successfully moved to have the first degree verdicts entered as second
degree felony convictions pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-402( 1) (BR 257-58,260; CR
424-25,436). On August 7,2000, defendants were sentenced to suspended terms of one-tofifteen years imprisonment and placed on probation on condition they serve one year in jail
and pay $ 18,500.00 infinesand surcharges (BR 260-68; CR 429-32). On February 22,2001,
defendants timely appealed (BR 302; CR 484).3
STATEMENT OF FACTS4
Defendants' plan to burn down the Frontier Barbeque Restaurant might have worked
if it had not been for Dave Winkleman. Winkleman lived in Kanab, Utah, but worked in
Page, Arizona (T 494:201). Every workday, he left Kanab early in the morning. March 24,
1998, was no exception (T 494: 201-02). At 4:30 a.m., as he was leaving Kanab, he noticed
a strange light at the Frontier Restaurant (T 494: 202). Driving closer, he saw flames under
the eaves of the southwest corner of the roof and realized the building was on fire (T 494:
203). He immediately drove to the nearest house and asked the occupant to call 911 (T 494:
3

A timely motion for new trial tolls the time for filing a notice of appeal. See
UTAH R. APP. P. 4(b). Here, defendants' original motion for new trial was premature (BR
255-56; CR 426-27). See UTAH R. CRIM. P. 24(c) (imposing a 10-day filing period after
sentencing or such other time set by the court within the 10-day period). At sentencing,
the court granted defendants 30 days to refile their motion (BR 267; CR 437). The court
ruled that the renewed motion was timely (BR 270-71, 278-79; CR 442-22,451-52). The
motion was ultimately denied on February 22, 2001 (BR 289-93; CR 473-75).
4

Defendants fail to marshal the evidence. See Point IV, infra. The State presents
the facts in the light most favorable to the verdict. See Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, \ 2.
5
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202-03). He drove back to the restaurant and pounded on its doors because he knew
defendants lived in the basement (T 494: 204). No one responded (T 494: 205, 209).
A few minutes later, John Martin, a volunteer Kanab City fireman, arrived (T 494:
205). Martin turned off the propane gas line to the building and joined Winkleman in
pounding on the doors (T 494: 205-06; T 495: 265). After another few minutes, Police
Officer Brent Smith arrived (T 494: 205,231-32). The three entered the restaurant through
the closed but unlockedfrenchdoor at the back of the building (T 494: 206, 233).5
Smoke was everywhere (T 494: 207, 214, 234). On the main floor, where the
restaurant was located, a ceiling board which normally covered a 2 x 2 foot attic access was
missing (T 494: 207,234-35; T 495: 286-87,289,403,416-17,424; T 497: 848). The attic
was on fire (T 494:208,214,234,243). Smith was concerned that defendants might still be
in the basement, but could not find the basement stairs due to the smoke (T 494: 232, 236).
Worried that the attic or roof might collapse, they left the building without searching for
defendants (T 494: 208, 236, 243-44).
Alan Alldredge, the Kanab City Fire Chief, arrived within minutes (T 495: 262-64).
He briefly went into the building with Smith and saw what the others had seen through the
attic access: "dense, dark smoke and fire" (T 495: 266-69).6 Two fire trucks and thirteen

5

There were no signs of forced entry: the back door (thefrenchdoor) was closed,
but unlocked and thefrontdoor, side entrance, back gate, and fence were locked (T 494:
233; T 495: 266, 319,414-15; T 497: 953). Defendants claimed that a photograph of the
back door, taken five months after the fire, showed signs of forced entry (T 499: 92-93).
6

Alldredge and Smith saw burning wood and smoke, but no indications of an
electrical fire (T 494: 235; T 495: 269). Alldredge then turned off the power (T 495: 266).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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6

firemen arrived (T 495: 270, 302). Most of the firemen attacked the spreading attic fire, but
Alldredge directed a couple into the basement (T 495: 271 -72,401 -03). The firemen radioed
back that Alldredge "better come down" because the basement "looked really suspicious"
(T 495: 273-74, 423). Unlike the firemen in full protective suits, Alldredge re-entered the
building without a protective mask (T 495: 274). As he descended the stairs, he smelled a
"paint thinner type smell" (T 495: 278-80). The smell was so strong that it hurt his eyes and
inhibited his breathing; after 30 seconds, he had to exit (T 495: 274).7
Alldredge put on protective gear, got his camera, and returned to the basement (T 495:
274-75, 281). In the southwest bedroom, Carpenter's bedroom, a large dresser was pushed
out of place and its drawers removed (T 495: 276; T 497: 1102). Some of the drawers were
stacked end-to-end on top of the dresser to the ceiling; the remaining drawers surrounded the
bottom of the dresser (T 495: 276, 37, 421-22). A large section of the Sheetrock ceiling,
measuring 2 x 4 feet, was cut out directly above the dresser (T 495: 277). The cut-out
Sheetrock was not in the bedroom (T 495: 276, 324). Some type of flammable liquid had
been poured "throughout" the dresser, including on the few clothes left in its drawers (T 495:
336, 454-55; T 496: 688-89).8 See Addendum B (Photographs).
7

Alldredge realized what he smelled might be accelerant, a flammable solvent (a
petroleum distillate) intentionally introduced to a location to spread a fire more quickly (T
495: 278; T 496: 585, 687-88; T 499: 78-79). See State v. Schultz, 2002 UT App 366, \
10 n.2, 58 P.3d 879 (referring to typical accelerants). Objects which burn but are
normally part of the location, such framing, ventilation systems, and oxygen, are
classified as the "natural fuel load"(T 496: 584-85; T 499: 78-79).
8

Wood burns much faster than Sheetrock (T 496: 657). The cut-out hole and
accelerant-soaked wooden dresser would have quickly moved the fire between the main
floor and basement if the attic fire had not been extinguished (T 496: 656-57).

7
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2 x 4 inch boards were on the bedroom floor and led from the dresser, out the
bedroom door, and down the hallway to the northwest bedroom "like a trail between the two
bedrooms" (T 495: 278, 284, 418-19, 455-56). "Fuel" was apparent on the boards (T 495:
455-56).9 See Addendum B.
At the entrance to the northwest bedroom, Beltran's room, a sheet of plywood was
angled up from the 2 x 4 boards on the floor to the dresser in the middle of the room (T 495:
418-19,431,461; T 497: 1103). The dresser drawers were stacked around and on top of the
dresser under a large "perfect square" cut-out hole in the ceiling, which exposed the wood
flooring above (T 495: 284, 371, 420, 459-60).

See Addendum B. Again, the cut-out

Sheetrock was not in the room (T 495: 284, 322, 324). Accelerant had been poured on
Beltran's dresser (T 495: 336,454-55; T 496: 687-89). Inside one drawer was a receipt for
five gallons of kerosene purchased eight days previously (T 495: 341-43, 462-63).10
In the basement's storage room, large paper-wrapped bundles of napkins were placed
twelve inches apart along the top shelf (T 495: 282, 308, 458-59). See Addendum B.

9

Boards soaked with accelerant are called "trailers" and are used to spread the fire
from one location to another (T 495: 456; T 496: 656-57). See State v. Nickles, 728 P.2d
123, 125 (Utah 1986) (noting use of "trailers" in intentional fires).
10

Carpenter did not purchase or store kerosene at the restaurant (T 496: 574).
Beltran claimed he purchased it to clean tar marks off Carpenter's motor home and clean
the vehicle's carburetor (T 497: 1049-55). He put the remainder of the five gallons into a
container in the shed and another in the motor home (T 497: 1056-59, 1120-21).
Chemical companies label the same chemical petroleum distillate under different
product-use names (e.g. kerosene, paint thinner, lighter fuel) (T 496: 688). This occurred
here: the "kerosene" purchased was not true kerosene, but a mixture of aromatic and
medium petroleum distillate (T 496: 688-691). The solvent in the basement was a similar
mixture of aromatic and medium petroleum distillate (T 495: 512-20; T 496: 687-89).
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Between the shelves, a 5 x 2 Vi foot section of Sheetrock ceiling was cut out, exposing the
underside of the wooden flooring above (T 495: 283,485-59). Again, the cut-out Sheetrock
was not in the room (T 495: 283, 324). Next to the storage room was a small room where
the restaurant's business records were normally stored; the room was empty except for
accelerant-soaked newspapers in the closet (T 495: 283, 519-20; T 497: 1104, 1106).11
Under the basement stairs near the apartment's kitchen, a 3 x 4 foot section of Sheetrock was
cut out and removed from the room (T 495: 285-86, 464-65; T 496: 884).
Numerous personal items appeared to have been removed from the basement and
restaurant (T 495:420-21; T 496: 623-25,627). The basement rooms were "very bare" and
pictures appeared to have been removed from the walls, leaving only bare nails (T 495:42021; T 496: 623-25,627). Empty clothes hangers and minimal clothing were in the bedroom
closets {id. & Exhibits 11& 13). Pictures of Carpenter's daughter had been removed from
their normal location on the mantle of the restaurant's fireplace (T 496:644-48,805-10,84849). Beltran's truck, which was normally parked next to the southwest corner of the
restaurant, the comer where the fire was first observed, was parked in an "unusual spot," very
close to the road (T 494: 223-28; T 495: 318). A small piece of painted pink and white

1!

Beltran claimed that prior to the fire, Carpenter's business records were moved
to the shed because the apartment had flooded (T 497: 1104-06). Two days before the
fire, Carpenter gave him a couple of bags of documents and "stuff to put in her motor
home (T 497: 1065). He claimed he did not know if the documents were the restaurant's
business records (T 497: 1065, 1106).
9
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Sheetrock was lodged in the bed of the truck (T 495: 334-35, 352). It was identical to the
missing sections of ceiling (T 495: 336-38).I2 See Exhibits 3 & 25.
Ultimately, the attic access was "completely ablaze" "like a fire ball" (T 495: 416,
423). The attic and roof were "petty well destroyed" (T 495: 294). The interior of a wall in
the main floor bathroom was damaged (T 495: 485-86,490-95). Burning debris fell on the
basement stairs, but the fire never reached the basement (T 495: 426, 490).
Both parties' experts agreed that the fire started near the attic access in the ceiling of
the restaurant (T 495: 503-04; T 497: 1149-54; T 499: 145, 162). The State's expert
concluded that accelerant was used and that the fire was intentionally set (T 496: 501, 581,
665, 667). He could not determine, however, what precise means was used to ignite the
blaze, i.e.,. "match, cigarette lighter, or what" (T 496:616). Defendants' experts opined that
an electrical short accidentally caused the fire (T 497: 1204; T 499: 145-52,162). But their
electrical expert admitted that the wires could have been intentionally manipulated to cause
an electrical short to ignite the fire (T 498: 1221-22).
The State's expert, Lynn Borg, a former Utah State Fire Marshal and now the State's
senior arson investigator, was at the restaurant by 11:00 a.m., only a few hours after the fire
was extinguished (T 495: 436-39, 451). Armed with a search warrant, Borg physically
examined all parts of the building and used a bucket truck to "crawl" through the unstable

12

Other than this piece, none of the missing Sheetrock was found (T 495: 276,
285, 322, 324; T 497: 923-24). Defendants denied using the truck to transport Sheetrock
(T 496: 573; T 497: 1108). Two days before the fire, an extra dumpster pick-up was
arranged, which the garbage man thought was "unusual" because it was the slow season
and he had already made the normal monthly pickup (T 494: 194-97).
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attic and hand-inspect the electrical wiring (T 495: 440: T 496: 593-598, 638-41). He also
used a hydrocarbon detector to determine if accelerant vapors were present (T 495:441 -49).
At the top of the basement stairs, Borg noticed the same strong smell of paint thinner,
or possibly kerosene, that Alldredge had earlier (T 495: 446-47, 620-21). As he went down
the stairs, the hydrocarbon detector went to "LEL" indicating an "explosive limit," and an
audio alarm sounded (T 495: 448, 621). There were "so many vapors in that atmosphere
there that [the detector] wouldn't even measure them.... The numerical measuring of the
hydrocarbon detector went clear off the scale. It wouldn't even measure how much . . .
flammable gas there was in the environment" (T 495:448-49). The smell became nauseating
(T 494: 450, 621). In the basement, Borg observed the same arson preparations that
Alldredge and his firefighters had (T 495: 451-68).13 Borg also examined the building's
electrical panel, but found no evidence ofburning or damage (T 495:469-89; T 496:638-43).
During his hands-on examination of the attic and roof, Borg found extensive evidence
of carbonization (T 495: 481-86).14 2 x 4 inch planks stacked around the attic access were
equally burned, a sign that accelerant was used (T 496: 586-87). The surrounding wood was
"totally burned or totally carbonized to where it's to a point where you can just break it into
small particles indicating that you have had a lot of heat on that to totally carbonize that
13

Defendants' arson expert refused to consider the presence of accelerant and the
arson preparations in the basement because the fire was in the attic (T 499: 154). Their
electrical expert was unaware of the preparations in the basement, but similarly opined
that such evidence was irrelevant to his opinion (T 498: 1219-20, 1229-30).
14

A high degree of carbonization indicates accelerant because flammable liquids
burn three times more BTU's then wood alone and, consequently, "totally carbonize
[wood] quickly" (T 495: 495-96).
U
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wood" (T 495: 483). The fire burned a large 15x4 foot hole in the center of the roof and a
smaller hole in the southwest corner (T 495: 486-88). See Addendum B.
Fire normally bums up and out in a V-pattern (T 495: 501-03). It does not bum on
a horizontal plane unless an accelerant is used (id.). Here, Borg found "unusual... extensive
low burning, horizontal burning right above the ceiling, out across that ceiling and around
the attic access hole" (T 495: 501 & 502). Such burning could not occur without "some type
of flammable liquid... being poured on that floor to cause it to bum across the [attic] floor
in that manner" (T 495:503). Oxygen from ventilation vents drew the fire into the southwest
comer of the attic, the area where the flames were first observed on the roof (T 494: 505).
Despite the physical evidence that an accelerant was used, Borg's hydrocarbon detector did
not register the presence of accelerant in the attic (T 495: 508-09). Borg was not surprised.
Whereas accelerant in the basement was unbumed, any accelerant in the attic was quicky
vaporized and "consumed" by the intensity of the fire (T 495: 510).
Borg discovered a large concave hole burnt in the south wall of the main floor
bathroom just below the attic access (T 495: 485-86, 490). Inside the wall, the wood was
extensively charred and the structural support "totally burned" (T 495: 490, 493). See
Addendum B. The bum pattern was V-shaped, but started about four or five feet above the
floor (T 495:490-95). Borg concluded that accelerant poured on the attic floor seeped down
and caused the charring and carbonization midway in the bathroom wall (T 495: 490-98).
Two weeks before the fire, defendants announced they were planning a trip to Arizona
(T 494: 220-21). Around the same time, they fired their only waiter/dishwasher (T 497: 846

12
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& 858). A few days later, on March 16, Beltran drove to Hurricane, Utah, and purchased
five gallons of kerosene (T 497: 1055).
Defendants claimed they left for Prescott, Arizona in Carpenter's 35-foot motor home
on Sunday, March 22, two days before the fire (T 496: 570;T497: 1061-62).15 They claimed
not to have returned to Kanab until Tuesday, March 24, hours after the fire (T 497: 1094).
However, a local nurse, who was familiar with the motor home, saw it in the restaurant's
parking lot on Monday, March 23, around noon (T 496: 751, 754-57). The bottom
compartments were open as if it were being loaded (T 496: 752).
According to defendants, they never reached Prescott because the motor home
experienced mechanical problems around Sedona, Arizona and they were forced to return
to Kanab (T 496: 1071-94). Carpenter told an investigator that they drove to Sedona via
Page, Arizona (Highway 89) and returned by the same route (T 496: 716-17). Beltran
testified they traveled via Fredonia and Marble Canyon, Arizona (Alternate Route 89) and
returned by the same route (T 496: 718-19, 794; T 497: 1071-94). Carpenter claimed she
took lots of pictures with her camera in Sedona (T 496: 720). Beltran said they took no
pictures because Carpenter left her camera at home (id.).
Beltran insisted that when they left Kanab, the building was locked, the attic access
cover was in place, the drawers were in the dressers, no holes were in the ceilings, and no
boards lined the hallway (T 497: 1066-70). He also insisted that the kerosene he purchased
was in containers in the shed and in the motor home (T 497: 1055-59, 1068, 1120-21).
15

The restaurant was normally closed on Sundays, Mondays, and Tuesdays (T
497: 851). March 22 was also the day of the extra dumpster pickup (T 494: 197).
"•-••'
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Beltran denied they removed personal items from the building, except for those
necessary for their trip (T 497: 1064). Yet, defendants took Carpenter's photo albums, a
couple bags of documents and "stuff," and the insurance policy for the building (T 496: 575;
T 497: 1065). On March 24, when defendants returned to the Frontier, Carpenter had the
insurance policy in her purse (T 496: 575). And before they were allowed back into the
building, Carpenter volunteered:
Carpenter. Clothes are all - or, clothes are out of all of those drawers that are
gone. I don't know why anybody would want to take somebody's clothes.
Insurance Adjuster: You are saying the clothes are gone?
Carpenter: Uh-huh . . . And some of the clothes in the closet.
(T 496: 722-25).
Carpenter ran the restaurant for about two years prior to the fire, first, under a lease
and later, in 1997, as the owner (T 497: 1013,1021). When she purchased the building, its
exterior and grounds were "shabby" and the restaurant's kitchen and basement living quarters
were in need of repairs (id.). Carpenter invested a "lot of money" in the property, but the
improvements were still not complete (T 497: 1015-16, 1021; T 499: 17). From March to
December 1997, Carpenter deposited gross receipts of $124,000.00 in the restaurant's bank
account (T 499: 13). Profits, however, were seasonal: October through March/April were
slow months, with business picking up in the summer (T 494: 313; T 497: 1022-23). By the
fall of 1997, Carpenter told a contractor she hired to build an addition to the restaurant that
she was experiencing "funding problems" (T 494: 191). The contractor stopped work on the
addition (T 494: 190-91). Defendants tried to finish the work themselves, but the result
violated the building code (T 496: 783). In March 1998, the city inspector cited Carpenter
•
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for the code violation and told her that either a professional architect needed to rebuild the
addition or the new structure would have to be torn down (T 496: 779-84; T 496: 822-833).
The cost of rebuilding was $12,000.00 (T 499: 8-9).
Carpenter concealed these facts from the investigating officers. When questioned by
Borg on March 25, the day after the fire, Carpenter insisted that the patio addition was
professionally built (T 496: 572). Even though she previously had admitted to the city
inspector that she and Beltran had worked on the addition, she now told Borg that Beltran
had not worked on the patio because he was physically incapable of that type of labor (T 496:
573). And despite the formal citation a week or so before, Carpenter told Borg that the
building inspector had "no problem" with the addition and she was in full compliance with
the building code (T 496: 572).
Carpenter told Borg she purchased her motor home in Arizona a year before the fire
(T 496: 574). Beltran admitted that she purchased the motor home in St. George, Utah, in
February 1998, the month before the fire, and only took possession in early March, a few
weeks before the fire (T497: 1033-37,1045; T 499: 36-38). Carpenter paid $10,000 down
on the vehicle about two weeks before receiving her citation and learning of the $12,000
repair (T 496: 779-80, 825; T 499: 36-38).
The market value of the restaurant without the completed improvements was about
$220,000, less the cost of the immediate $12,000 repair, or about $ 208,000 (T 499: 8-9,1718). If put on the market, the commercial property would take up to a year to sell (T 498:
19-20). The insurance value on the building was $250,000, with an additional $85,000 for
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personal items (T 495:433-35). The prosecutor argued that Carpenter would gain more from
her insurance than from a sale (T 500: 11-12, 20-21, 22, 62).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The merits of defendants' appeal should not be considered because defendants have

<

failed to properly brief the issues or marshal the evidence. All of defendants' issues are factdependent, yet they have not marshaled the evidence in support of the trial court's rulings or
the jury verdict. Nor have defendants engaged in proper legal analysis. Based on
defendants' procedural failures, their convictions should be summarily affirmed. Even if the
merits of the appeal are considered, affirmance is still appropriate.

'

Validity of Search Warrant: The trial court properly admitted two items seized in
plain view. It correctly ruled that fourteen other items were seized pursuant to a search
warrant issued by an authorized magistrate which, when read with its accompanying
affidavit, particularly described the items to be seized. The court then individually reviewed
the fourteen items and concluded that seven of them should be suppressed because they were
beyond the scope of the warrant, but the other remaining seven items were validly seized
and, therefore, admissible. The ruling is correct.
But even if admission of the items were erroneous as claimed by defendant, any error
would be harmless. Firemen, lawfully in the building, observed the same items prior to their
subsequent challenged seizure. Because the firemen testified to their observations, the
admission of the physical objects was merely cumulative of their testimony.

16
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Plain Error in Voir Dire: Below, defendants conceded that the jury voir dire was fair
and complete. They also waived any for-cause challenges to the four jurors in question and
failed to use available peremptory challenges to remove them. Consequently, defendants'
plain error argument necessarily fails because their actions invited any alleged error.
Defendants challenged Juror Jones' residency in a motion for new trial. The motion
was properly denied because the evidence established that Jones was a Utah resident even
though he worked in Arizona. Consequently, no plain error occurred.
Motion for New Trial Based on Alleged Juror Misconduct: Defendants moved for
a new trial on the ground that jurors improperly conversed with the prosecutor's wife's
during trial. The record establishes that one juror may have engaged in a brief common
courtesy exchange with the prosecutor's wife at a drinking fountain. A second juror
approached the wife in the hall to inform her of their mutual involvement in an upcoming
community musical. The two did not discuss the trial or the parties. The trial court did not
abuse its discretion in concluding that these minimal contacts did not justify a new trial.
Sufficiency of the Evidence: The experts disagreed on whether the fire was
accidentally or intentionally set. This disagreement provides no basis for reversing the
verdicts. The jury was entitled to accept one opinion over the other or reject both and rely
on their own evaluation of the evidence.
Moreover, the exact manner in which the fire was ignited is not determinative where,
as here, the evidence supports that the fire was intentional. Even defendants' electrical
expert admitted that the electrical short which he believed ignited the fire could have been

17
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intentionally manipulated. And their arson expert conceded that it would be rare to have an
accidental electrical fire ignite part of a building at the same time that another part of the
building was fully prepared for arson. Given the totality of the evidence, the jury reasonably
concluded that defendants aided and abetted each other in setting a fire to intentionally
damage the building.
ARGUMENT
POINTI
DEFENDANTS FAIL TO ESTABLISH ERROR IN THE TRIAL
COURT'S DENIAL OF THEIR MOTIONS TO SUPPRESS
The trial court ruled that a search warrant executed on March 24, the day of the fire,
was issued by an authorized magistrate and, when read with its accompanying affidavit,
sufficiently described the items to be seized (BR 167-175; CR 275-77,295-303; T 492:145,
157-58, 178-82; T 501: 35-38, 46-64). The court also found that some items were exempt
from the warrant requirement because they were in plain viewfroma position in the parking
lot or seen by the firemen when they were legitimately in the premises pursuant to the
exigency of the fire (id.). Consequently, the court denied defendants' motions to suppress
nine items (id). At the same time, the court suppressed seven other items which either did
not constitute "evidence of arson" or were seized during an unauthorized re-entry on March
25 (id.). See Addendum C (Search Warrant/Affidavit; Rulings on Motion to Suppress).
In Issue I of their brief, defendants present six challenges (Points I-VI) to the trial
court's ruling, which can be summarized as follows:

18
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Point /: the warrant lacks particularity in its description of the items to be
seized and a coffee cup, two pairs of Nike shoes, and a yellow flashlight (Items
1 -4) should be suppressed because they do not constitute "evidence of arson";
Point II: the warrant's lack of particularity results in its being a general
warrant and any items seized should be suppressed;
Point III: the firemen could not permissibly enter the basement because the fire
was in the attic and the smell of solvent cannot justify the intrusion;
Point IV: the officers made an unauthorized re-entry on March 25 and seized
a cardboard sample, a purse, and two photographs (Items 8-10) which should
be suppressed;
Point V: the magistrate, as a non-lawyer justice of the peace, could only issue
a warrant for property in the Orderville precinct and, therefore, the warrant for
property in Kanab is invalid;
Point VI: the samples seized should be suppressed because they were
contaminated and their chain-of-custody compromised.
{Brief of Appellant [Br.Aplt.J at 9-23). None of these challenges, however, should be
considered because defendants have failed to properly marshal the evidence in support of the
trial court's findings or ruling. Moreover, Points II & IV-VI are not properly briefed.
Alternatively, even if the briefing defects are overlooked, Points I and IV are moot and Point
IV is not preserved. Consequently, only the merits of Points II, III & V should be
considered.

But even if considered, the trial court correctly rejected these claims.

Consequently, whether on procedural or substantive grounds, the challenges fail.
(A) The Merits of the Suppression Order Should Not Be Considered
Because Defendants Fail to Marshal the Facts in Support of the Ruling.
A trial court's factual findings underlying a denial of a motion to suppress are entitled
to deference and may be rejected on appeal only if clearly erroneous. State v. Fridleifson,
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2002 UT App 322, % 7,57 P.3d 1098. Morever, even though a trial court's legal conclusions
are subject to de novo review, the fact-dependent nature of Fourth Amendment inquiries
demand that a "measure of discretion [be accorded] to the trial judge's application of the
legal standard to the facts." Id. An appellant wishing to attack a denial of a suppression
motion must do more than "merely mak[e] the pertinent excerpts from the record readily
available to a reviewing court." Neely v. Bennett, 2002 UT App 189, f 11, 51 P.3d 724.
Instead, he or she must "marshal aU of the evidence that arguably supports" the trial court
ruling and, after gathering "every scrap" of evidence, become a "devil's advocate" by
"temporarily removing] its own prejudices and fully embracing] the adversary's position."
Harding v. Bell, 2002 UT 108, f 19,57 P.3d 1093 (citing Neely, id.) (emphasis in original).
See also Utah R. App. P. 24(a) (imposing marshaling requirement on all appellants). Here,
defendants fail to meet this requirement.
The most glaring marshaling defect is defendants' failure to acknowledge that the trial
court granted in part their motions to suppress. In Point I, defendants argue that a coffee
mug, Nike shoes, and a flashlight were not authorized to be seized because they did not
constitute "evidence of arson" {Br.Aplt. at 10). But defendants fail to acknowledge that the
trial court agreed and suppressed these items (BR 169; CR 297). Defendants' failure to
marshal this fact contravenes the requirements of rule 24(a) and results in the needless
presentation of a moot issue on appeal.

Consequently, the State will only address

defendants' particularity argument in the context of defendants' Point II, that is, in relation
to items which were not suppressed. See Subsection 1(C), infra.
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Similarly, in Points I and IV, defendants claim that an unauthorized re-entry was made
the day after the search warrant was executed (Br.Aplt. at 12-13, 17-18). Again, defendants
fail to acknowledge that the trial court agreed that a re-entry was made on March 25 and
suppressed all items seized as a result of that re-entry, specifically, a cardboard sample, a
purse, and two photographs (BR 169; CR 297). This issue, therefore, is moot and the State
will not address it.
In Point II, defendants assert that the search warrant's alleged lack of particularity
transformed it into a general warrant (Br.Aplt. at 14-16). Again, defendants have failed to
marshal or even acknowledge salient facts: Fire Chief Alldredge, the affiant, executed the
warrant with Chief Arson Investigator Borg (BR 170; CR 298). This critical finding - that
the affiant executed the warrant - underlies the court's legal determination that "because the
search warrant was executed by the signer of the affidavit... the lack of specificity in the
search warrant may be bolstered by the specificity in the affidavit" (BR 168; CR 296). The
fact that two trained fire investigators oversaw the search also underlies the court's
determination that, based on their training, the persons executing the warrant reasonably
understood what the magistrate intended by the term "evidence of arson" (id.).
Moreover, in challenging the warrant, defendants fail to acknowledge the trial court's
finding that two of the items seized were in plain view from the restaurant's parking lot. The
trial court found that the small piece of Sheetrock was in open view when an officer, standing
in the parking lot, observed it in the bed of Beltran's truck (BR 167; CR 295; T 501:48-49).
The trial court likewise found that the photographs and video of the fire damage to the roof
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and attic were taken by firemen looking down on the building from a bucket truck
legitimately in the parking lot (BR 167; CR 295; T 501: 50, 52-53, 55-58). Defendants do
not attack these findings; they simply ignore them.
Similarly, in Points III, V, and VI, defendants ignore relevant factual findings
underlying the court's legal conclusions that the initial entries were lawful, that the
magistrate was authorized to issue the warrant, and that any alleged contamination of the
seized items went to their foundational, not constitutional, admissibility (Addendum Q.
In sum, defendants' failures to marshal justify summary rejection of Issue I in its
entirety. See State v. Gamblin, 2000 UT 44,1f 17, & n.2, 1 P.3d 1108 (recognizing that an
appellate court may summarily refuse to consider the merits when an appellant has failed to
properly marshal). Alternatively, Points I and IV are moot.
(B) The Merits of the Suppression Ruling Should Not Be Considered
Because Defendants9 Arguments Are Not Preserved and Improperly Briefed.
This Court will not consider claims raised for the first time on appeal. State v.
Holgate, 2000 UT 74, f 11, 10 P.3d 346 (reaffirming general mle). Nor will it consider
issues which have not been properly briefed. State v. Lucero, 2002 UT App 135,fflf8-13,
47 P.3d 107 (discussing specific requirements of rule 24(a)).
In Point VI, defendants assert that the seized items containing accelerant should have
been suppressed because they were contaminated in the course of their seizure (Br.Aplt. at
22-23). However, when raised below, the trial court ruled that chain-of-custody issues were
not properly included within a Fourth Amendment challenge, but could be part of a
evidentiary foundational challenge at trial (T 492: 182). Defense counsel agreed and stated
22
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that if defendants decided to pursue the issue, they would file a new motion (T 492: 183).
They did not. And when the various items were introduced at trial, defendants raised no
objections to their admission on foundational grounds.16 Consequently, defendants have
waived consideration of Point VI and may not raise it for the first time on appeal.
Additionally, defendants have failed to properly brief Points II & IV-VI. In Point II,
they set forth the facts of a federal circuit court case, but then, without any analysis of the
facts in this case, summarily assert that the search warrant here is a prohibited general
warrant (Br.Aplt. at 14-15). Point IV is completely devoid of legal analysis {Br.Aplt. at 1718), and, in any case, is moot. See Subsection 1(A), supra. In Point V, defendants claim that
a non-lawyer justice of the peace may not issue a search warrant, but cite no supporting
authority and ignore statutory law to the contrary {Br.Aplt. at 18-21). See Subsection 1(E),
infra. Point VI {Br.Aplt. at 22-23) contains no authority and, in any case, is not preserved
and waived. See discussion, above.
In sum, defendants' inadequate briefing precludes consideration of the merits of
Points II & IV-VI. Alternatively, even if properly briefed, Point VI is not preserved.
(C) The Trial Court Correctly Ruled that the Warrant, When Read with its
Accompanying Affidavit, Sufficiently Described the Items to Be Seized.
Defendant claims that Items 5-7 and 11-15, plus photographs and a video of the fire
damage, must be suppressed because the search warrant's alleged lack of particularity
rendered it a general warrant {Br.Aplt. at 14-16). The claim lacks merit.
16

Defendants objected on relevancy grounds, claiming that whatever was found in
the basement was irrelevant because the fire was in the attic (T 494: 252-260). The trial
court overruled the objection (T 494: 260).
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The trial court admitted Item 5 (the Sheetrock in Beltran's truck) and the photographs
and video under the plain view exception to the warrant requirement (Addendum Q. This
exception permits the seizure of "objects falling within the plain view of an officer from a
position where he is entitled to be. . . . For an officer to look at what is in open view from
a position lawfully accessible to the public cannot constitute an invasion of a reasonable
expectation of privacy." State v. Holden, 964 P.2d 318, 321 (Utah App.), cert denied, 982
P.2d 88 (Utah 1998). Here, a Highway Patrol pilot, who transported Borg to the scene,
observed the quarter-sized piece of painted Sheetrock in the open bed of Beltran's truck
parked next to the road in the restaurant's parking lot (BR 169; CR 297; T 492: 165-66; T
501: 48-49). Similarly, a bucket fire truck in the parking lot to fight the fire was used by
Alldredge and others to look down on the collapsed roof and exposed attic of the restaurant
and take pictures and a video of the damage (BR 169; CR 297; T 492:65-66; T 501: 50-53).
Defendants have not properly attacked these findings on appeal. See Subsection 1(A), supra.
In any case, the evidence supports the factual findings which, in turn, support the court's
legal conclusion that the Sheetrock, photographs, and video were all admissible.
The trial court admitted the remaining seven items (Items 6-7 & 11-15) pursuant to
the search warrant, which the court concluded sufficiently described the items to be seized
(BR 167-68, 173-75; CR 295-296, 302-03). See Addendum C. This ruling is correct.
The Fourth Amendment requires a search warrant to describe with "particularity" the
items to be seized, but the "adequacy of a description in a search warrant depends in every
instance upon the particular facts of the case." State v. Anderson, 701 P.2d 1099, 1102
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(Utah 1985). "Without substantial justification, warrants describing property only in generic
terms (terms applicable to an entire class of property) are not favored by the law. However,
use of such descriptions have been allowed when a more specific description of the things
to be seized is unavailable." State v. Gallegos, 712 P.2d 207, 209 (Utah 1985). In other
words, while the description must be "'such that the officer with a search warrant can with
reasonable effort ascertain and identify'" the item or place to be searched, Anderson, 701
P.2d at 1102 (quoting Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 498, 503 (1925)) (emphasis in
original), "the specificity required is flexible and will vary with the circumstances and the
type of items involved." United States v. Ellison, 793 F.2d 942,948 (8th Cir.), cert, denied,
479 U.S. 937 (1986). Accord State v. Norris, 2001 UT 104, UK 21-22,48 P.3d 872 (holding
that an "all records" warrant is constitutional where the business to be searched is "permeated
with fraud"), cert denied, 535 U.S. 1062 (2002); Gallegos,l\2 P.2d at 209-10 (recognizing
that more generalized descriptions are permissible in drug cases and the like "where the
inherent nature of the property sought... precludes specific description" or "where attendant
circumstances prevented a detailed description from being given").
While the question of particularity is a legal one, its determination is practical. See
Anderson, 701 P.2d at 1102 (recognizing fact-dependent nature of legal inquiry); United
States v. Finnigin, 113 F.3d 1182, 1187 (10th Cir. 1997) (applying "practical" test).
[I]f the purpose of a search is to find a specific item of property, it should be
described in the warrant with sufficient particularity to preclude an officer
from seizing the wrong property. On the other hand, if the purpose of a search
is to seize any property of a specified character, a particularized description is
unnecessary and often impossible.
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State v. Withers, 504 P.2d 1151,1154 (Wash. App. 1972). The latter situation applies to fire
investigations. Even when arson is reasonably suspected, the specific cause of a fire is
generally unknown prior to a complete search of the premises. Moreover, the range of
possible causes is broad and may be masked or even obliterated by the fire damage.
Consequently, courts approve of more generalized descriptions whenfiresare involved. See,
e.g., Finnigin, 113 F.3d at 1186-87 (concluding that a warrant to search a burned trailer was
sufficiently particular where it described the items to be seized as any "unlawful explosives,
components or materials" and "any equipment capable of use for the manufacture or
assembly of said unlawful explosive devices"); Withers, 504 P.2d at 126-27 (holding that a
search warrant for a fire-damaged ship suspected of carrying stolen cargo was sufficiently
specific when it authorized seizure of "merchandise from disabled ship Don Jose" because
time concerns and the fire prevented any more specific description).
Additionally, in determining if a warrant meets constitutional specificity, the warrant
may be read with its accompanying affidavit to determine what was "contemplated by the
magistrate authorizing the warrant." Anderson, 701 P.2d at 1103. Accord State v. South,
932 P.2d 622, 625 (Utah App.) (recognizing that under Utah law, the affidavit may be
considered when the warrant specifically refers to it), cert, denied, 940 P.2d 1224 (Utah
1997); State v. Mclntire, 768 P.2d 970, 972 (Utah App. 1989) (recognizing that a warrant
may be read with its "accompanying" affidavit). Here, the warrant is based on "[pjroof by
affidavit under oath having been made this day before [the magistrate] by Alan Alldredge"
(Addendum Q. Additionally, the trial court found that Alldredge signed the affidavit,
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executed the search warrant, and was present throughout the search (BR 170; CR 298, T 501:
59-60). Consequently, the court correctly ruled that the warrant and affidavit could be read
together (BR 168; CR 296; T 501: 59).
Defendants not only ignore the trial court's ruling, they fail to recognize the authority
upon which it is justifiably predicated. Instead, defendants improperly focus on the warrant
alone. The warrant authorized the seizure of "any item o r . . . evidence of arson of reckless
burning, possessed or left by a party to the illegal conduct" (Addendum Q. This language,
though broad, is constitutionally sufficient when read in the context of the affidavit (T 501 :
12-14,35-38).
Alldredge's affidavit described the building to be searched as the Frontier Restaurant,
consisting of the restaurant and the basement apartment occupied by defendants (Addendum
C). The affidavit described the fire damage to the roof and southwest portion of the building
and the smoke damage throughout the building (id). It described the stacked dressers in the
basement, the cut-out portions of the Sheetrock ceiling, and the napkins stacked in the
storage room (id.). It specifically noted that the cut-out Sheetrock has not been located (id.).
It then described the strong smell of a paint thinner-like solvent throughout the basement and
especially in the storage area (id.). The affidavit stated that defendants were reportedly outof-town, but there were no signs of forced entry (id.).
The trial court correctly concluded that in light of the affidavit, the warrant's
authorization to seize "evidence of arson or reckless burning" on the Frontier premises was
sufficiently descriptive to guide the fire chief and senior arson investigator who were
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executing the warrant (BR 168; CR 296; T 501: 35-38). The court reasonably refused to
suppress seized items which were clearly connected with the suspected arson described in
the affidavit. These items included: basement drywall, accelerant-soaked newspaper from
the middle room, accelerant-soaked clothing from the dressers, a receipt for kerosene found
in one dresser, and a container offlammableliquid and a can of paint thinner in the shed (BR
169; CR 297). Given the attendant circumstances of the investigation, the warrant fully
comports with the Fourth Amendment. See Norris, 2001 UT 104, ff 21-22; Gallegos, 712
P.2d at 209-10 (both recognizing permissibility of more generalized descriptions dependent
upon the facts of the individual investigation).
(D) The Trial Court Correctly Ruled that the Initial Warrantless Entry into
the Basement Was Justified.
Defendant contends that the firemen could not enter the basement because thefirewas
located in the attic and the smell of solvent in the basement did not provide probable cause
for its search {Br.Aplt at 16-17). The claim lacks support.
The trial court found thatfrom4:00 a.m. to approximately 7:00 a.m., the burning fire
created an exigency which justified the firefighters' warrantless entry into the building (T
501: 50-51). See Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509 (1978) (holding that "a burning
building clearly presents an exigency of sufficient proportions to render a warrantless entry
reasonable"). The court refused to distinguish between the restaurant and basement because
both areas were equally exposed to the fire if the attic or roof collapsed; moreover, people
could still be in the basement (T 501: 52-43). It was during this exigent period that Fire
Chief Alldredge smelled solvent and he and his men observed the arson preparations in the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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basement (T 501: 51). The court ruled that the firemen's entries were justified and
Alldredge's photographs of what was in plain view permissible (T 501: 52-54). See Tyler,
id. (recognizing that firemen may seize "evidence of arson that is in plain view"). The ruling
is correct. See id. at 510 (holding that officials may "remain in a building for a reasonable
time to investigate the cause of a blaze after it has been extinguished . . . and the warrantless
seizure of evidence while inspecting the premises for these purposes also is constitutional").
The trial court also correctly ruled that after the fire was extinguished and the
exigency ended, further investigation required a warrant (T 501: 54-55). See Michigan v.
Clifford, 464 U.S. 287,293, reh 'g. denied, 465 U.S. 1084 (1984) (requiring a search warrant
for "additional investigations begun after the fire has been extinguished and fire and police
officials [leave] the scene"). The warrant was properly based on the plain view observations
of Alldredge and his men during the initial warrantless investigation (T 501: 51). The
warrant properly also included Alldredge's detection of solvent in the basement (T 492:
145). Though defendants assert that smell cannot form the basis of a probable cause
determination (Br.Aplt. at 17), their cited authority contradicts them:
If the presence of odors is testified to before a magistrate and he finds the
affiant qualified to know the odor, and it is one sufficiently distinctive to
identify a forbidden substance, this Court has never held such a basis
insufficient to justify issuance of a search warrant. Indeed it might very well
be found to be evidence of most persuasive character.
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13 (1948). Accord State v. Naisbitt, 827 P.2d 969,
972 (Utah App. 1992) (upholding a search of a vehicle on plain smell alone). Accordingly,
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the trial court correctly concluded that the observations of Alldredge and hisfirefighters
were a legitimate predicate for the warrant (T 501: 50-53).
(E) The Trial Court Correctly Concluded that the Search Warrant Was
Issued by an Authorized Magistrate.
Defendants argue that the justice of the peace who issued the search warrant was not
legally authorized to do so because he was not a lawyer and he acted outside his jurisdiction
{Br.Aplt. 18-21). The argument has no merit.
Below, defendants admitted that Justice Hoyt could legally perform all magisterial
functions in the justice courts of Orderville, but asserted that as a non-lawyer, he could not
be appointed pro tern magistrate for purposes of conducting a preliminary hearing in the
district court in Kanab (T 492:130-39,173). The trial court found that Justice Hoyt was duly
authorized to conduct the preliminary hearing and denied defendants' motion to quash the
bindover (T 492: 157,177-78). On appeal, defendants do not challenge the bindover order,
nor could they: their convictions render the issue moot. See State v. Morgan, 2001 UT 87,
!7n.l,34P.3d767.
Below, defendants did not challenge Justice Hoyfs authority to issue a search warrant
for property located in Orderville, but like their bindover argument, claimed he could not
issue a warrant for property in Kanab (T 492: 139). Now, for the first time on appeal and
without any supporting authority, defendants claim that a non-lawyer justice of the peace
may never issue a search warrant {Br.Aplt. at 20-21). Because defendants' failed to preserve
this argument and failed to properly brief it, this Court should summarily reject it. See cases
cited, Subsection 1(B), supra. If the Court considers the issue, it is without merit.
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Defendants are correct that issuance of a search warrant is a core judicial function.
See State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299,302-03 (Utah 1998) (holding that a search warrant is an
enforceable order and, therefore, its issuance is a core judicial function). But non-lawyer
judges may lawfully perform judicial functions. See Utah Const, art. VIII, § § 1, 5, & 11
(authorizing legislative establishment of "courts not of record" and prohibiting any
requirement that judges of such courts be admitted to the practice of law). See also UTAH
CODE ANN. § 78-5-101 (2002) (establishing justice courts as "courts not of record").
Here, the court found that Justice Hoyt was "duly-appointed" (T 492: 157).
Defendants' only challenge to that determination is to attack his pro tern appointment in
Kanab {Br.Aplt. at 19-20). But Justice Hoyt's pro tern status only relates to the preliminary
hearing, it has no bearing on his authority to issue a search warrant because a justice of the
peace may issue a warrant to search any location within the judicial district. See UTAH CODE
ANN. § 78-7-17.5(2)(c) (2002) (limiting a justice's authority to issue a search warrant to
those locations "within the judicial district"). See also UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-1-3(4) (1999)
(designating a justice as a "magistrate"); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-23-201(2) (1999)
(permitting magistrates to issue search warrants); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-5-106 (2002)
(same). Consequently, Justice Hoyt, as a justice within the Sixth Judicial District, was
authorized to issue a search warrant for property located in Kanab, a city within that district.
(F) Alternatively, Even if Error Occurred, the Error is Harmless Because
Admission of the Seized Items Was Cumulative of Other Testimony.
The trial court found that even if the search warrant were defective, the searching
officers relied on it in good faith and, therefore, suppression of items seized pursuant to it
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would not be justified (BR 167;CR295;T501: 60). Generally, however, good faith cannot
justify reliance on a warrant which is facially defective due to lack of particularity. See
UnitedStates v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 923 (1984).
Assuming arguendo that the warrant were found to be defective and Leon found to
be inapplicable, any error would still be harmless. Admission of Items 6-7 & 11-15 was
cumulative of Chief Alldredge's and the other firefighters' testimony.17 As the trial court
found, Alldredge and the otherfiremenfully observed the arson preparations in the basement,
including the solvent, during the initial exigency period in which no warrant was required
(T 501: 50-53). They testified to these observations at trial. See Statement ofFacts, supra.
Consequently, even if the admission of the physical objects were error, no prejudice resulted.
See State v. Genovesi, 909 P.2d 916, 923-924 (Utah App. 1995) (concluding that no
prejudice resulted from the admission of illegally seized physical objects where the officer
testified to his lawful observations of the same objects).
POINT II
DEFENDANTS FAIL TO ESTABLISH THAT THE TRIAL COURT
PLAINLY ERRED IN THE JURY VOIR DIRE
Defendants claim that the court plainly erred in questioning Jurors Scott Johnson,
Wendy Harris, and Blane Harris about their relationship to each other and their relatives'
government employment (Br.Aplt. at 23-32). They also claim the court plainly erred in not

17

The admissibility of the Sheetrock chip, photographs, and video was not
dependent on the validity of the warrant. See Subsection 1(C).
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exploring Juror Justin Jones's residency and, because Jones is allegedly not a Utah resident,
a new trial should be granted (Br.Aplt. at 26-27). The claims have no merit.
(A) The Voir Dire Should Not Be Reviewed Because Defendants Fail to Cite
Relevant Facts and Controlling Case Law.
Defendants do not fairly present the voir dire. They focus on isolated questions posed
to the four jurors, without presenting all the questions asked of these jurors or the related
questions asked of the panel as a whole. Compare Defendant fs Facts at 24-27, with State's
Voir Dire Excerpts (Addendum D). Additionally, defendants fail to fully acknowledge the
waivers and stipulations of their counsel. See Subsection 11(B), infra. Nevertheless,
defendants claim that the trial court plainly erred. An appellant cannot claim that a court
committed obvious prejudicial error without first presenting all relevant facts. Cf. Lucero,
2002 UT App 135, % 9 (noting rule 24's requirement to fairly set out facts pertinent to an
argument). Consequently, this Court should decline to consider the merits of their claim.
Cf. Gamblin, 2000 UT 44, f 17, & n.2 (refusing to consider merits of an unmarshaled claim).
Defendants' failure to fully present the relevant facts leads to other briefing failures.
Defendants' legal analysis is six pages of verbatim quotations from State v. Woolley, 810
P.2d 440 (Utah App.), cert denied, 826 P.2d 651 (Utah 1991) (Br.Aplt. at 27-32). This does
not met the requirements of rule 24(a). See Lucero, 2002 UT App 135, f 11 (recognizing
rule 24's requirement of meaningful analysis of legal authority). Moreover, Woolley does
not control where counsel strategically chose not to object to the jurors in question.
Woolley recognizes a trial court's discretion in conducting voir dire, but holds that
"[o]nce a juror's impartiality has been put in doubt, a trial judge must investigate by further
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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questions to determine if the juror has merely 'light impressions' or impressions which are
'strong and deep' and which will affect the juror's impartiality." 810 P.2d at 443 . "When
comments are made which facially question a prospective juror's impartiality or prejudice,
an abuse of discretion may occur unless the challenged juror is removed by the court or

<

unless the court or counsel investigates and finds the inference rebutted." Id. (citation
omitted). But as Woolley recognizes, this requirement is conditioned upon a defendant
objecting. Id. at 441-43.
Here, defendants not only failed to object, their counsel affirmatively stipulated that
the voir dire was adequate, affirmatively waived any for-cause objections to the four jurors,
and strategically chose not to use available peremptory challenges to remove them (T 494:
118-19,147-48). Consequently, the Woolley standard does not apply. Instead, to challenge
the voir dire for the first time on appeal, defendants must establish that (1) the trial court
erred its voir dire, (2) the error was obvious, (3) the error prejudiced the outcome of the trial
in that an actual bias juror sat, and (4) defendants did not invite the error. See State v.
Bloomfield, 2003 UT App 3, ^ 7, 63 P.3d 110 (recognizing limitation placed on the plain
error standard by the invited error doctrine). See also State v. Wach, 2001 UT 35, ^f 24, 24
P.3d 948 (recognizing requirement that to show prejudice in voir dire, an appellant must
establish that the failure to remove a juror resulted in the actual seating of a juror who was
"partial or incompetent").
Furthermore, in considering whether defendants invited the alleged error, deference
must be accorded to their trial counsel's legitimate personal preferences in selecting the jury
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even if those choices appear "counterintuitive." See State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, f 22,
12 P.3d 92. "For instance, an attorney may make a reasoned judgment that a prospective
juror's consciousness of, and concern for, his or her own potential bias actually provides a
more sure foundation for confidence in that juror's reasoning processes. The attorney may
even sense that the prospective juror is likely to 'overcompensate' by assigning more weight
to or credibility to testimony that tends to oppose the juror's own potential bias." Id. "If
defense counsel 'has made a conscious decision to refrain from objecting or has led the trial
court into error, [the appellate court] will then decline to save that party from the alleged
plain error."18 Bloom field, 2003 UT App 3, f 7.
Defendants'failure to acknowledge this precedent justifies summary rejection of their
claim. See Lucero, 2002 UT App 135, Iff 11-12. But even if the merits are considered, the
claim fails.
(B) Defendants Have Not Established Obvious Error in the Jury Voir Dire.
Defendants claim that the trial court plainly erred in questioning:
(1) Juror Scott Johnson concerning his wife's employment by Kanab City
(Br.Aplt. at 25);
(2) Juror Wendy Harris concerning her husband's and brother-in-law's
employment by Kane County and her brother's employment by the Kanab City
Police Department {Br.Aplt. at 26);
(3) Juror Blane Harris concerning his relationship with his sister-in-law, Juror
Wendy Harris (Br.Aplt at 27); and
(4) Juror Justin Jones concerning his Utah residency and about pretrial
exposure to the case (Br.Aplt. at 26).
18

In their Statement of Issues, defendants assert that their trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to object to the jurors (Br.Aplt. at 2), but fail to present any
argument on the point. Even if defendants had properly raised an ineffectiveness claim,
the applicable standards would be the same.
35

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

According to defendants, the court asked essentially no follow-up questions of these jurors
and did not properly consider the evidence produced in the post-trial hearing on Jones'
residency {Br.Aplt. at 24-27). Defendants' contentions are without merit.
The primary fallacy of defendants' argument is their assumption that government
employment disqualifies a juror. It does not. Rule 18(e)(4), Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure, states that "[a] prospective juror shall not be disqualified solely because the juror
is indebted to or employed by the state or a political subdivision thereof." Such associations
may, of course, be relevant if a juror would be inclined to favor one side over the other.
Here, the court extensively questioned the panel concerning their knowledge of and
relationship to either of the parties, their attorneys, or any witness. This included the juror
and their spouse employment (T 494: 39-57); whether they knew of or employed or were
employed by any party, attorney, or witness (T 494: 57-62, 65, 70); whether they were
related to any police officers orfiremen(T 494:75,79,94); and whether they had any family
relationships with other prospective jurors (T 494:95). The court spent some time explaining
the type of relationships or influences that might bias a juror (T 494: 70-72, 76-77). The
court explained that in a "fairly sparsely populated area" like Kane County, many people
might be acquaintances, but the court was concerned with those relationships which might
impact their judgement for or against a party {id.). The court also asked about pretrial
publicity or exposure to the case (T 494: 82). Jurors who expressed knowledge of the case
beyond minimal gossip were privately questioned (T 494: 111-45).
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In all, the court removed for cause or otherwise excused 30 jurors (T 494: 30-31,1-409,116,122,125,129,147,136-45). It denied only one of defendants' for-cause challenges
(T 494: 140-43) and actively solicited additional challenges because the court had "plenty
of jurors" (T 494: 147). At the end of voir dire, the court asked defense counsel if he had
more questions or challenges; he did not (T 494: 156). The court then asked if defense
counsel stipulated to the qualifications of the remaining jurors; he did (id.). When defense
counsel sought two additional peremptory challenges over those given to the prosecution, the
court granted them (T 494: 157).
Juror Scott Johnson was a mechanic who lived in Kanab City for 53 years; his wife
worked for Kanab City (T 494:39). He had no relationship with any one connected with the
case and had no knowledge of the case (T 494: 147). Juror Johnson never indicated that he
felt more inclined towards one party than the other. Defense counsel affirmatively waived
any challenge to him and did not use a peremptory to remove him (T 494: 35, 147). See
Litherland, 2000 UT 76, f 25 (recognizing that when counsel fails to object to a juror, the
"ordinary presumption" is that counsel made a justifiable strategic choice). Given counsel's
actions, the court committed no obvious error in assuming that the voir dire was adequate and
that defendants had actively chosen to retain Johnson on the jury. See Bloomfield, 2003 UT
App 3, f 7 (recognizing that counsel's conscious choices preclude plain error review); State
v. Cosey, 873 P.2d 1177, 1179-80 (Utah App.) (recognizing that it would be improper to
speculate as to counsel's reasoning in selecting a particular juror, where counsel was actively
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participating in the jury selection process), cert, denied, 883 P.2d 1359 (Utah 1994). See
also Addendum D.
Juror Justin Jones lived in Kanab, but also lived (when working) on his father's ranch
60 miles south of Kanab in Arizona (T 494: 43). He called what he knew about the case as
nothing more than "gossip" (T 494: 85).I9 Counsel specifically waived any challenge for
cause to him and chose not to use a peremptory to remove him (T 494: 35,148; T 503:4,1819). Defendants have established no obvious error in the court's assumption that voir dire
was adequate and defendants wished to retain Jones. See id.
Subsequently, defendants moved for new trial, claiming that Jones's voir dire
responses were ambiguous and he "may not" be a Utah resident (T 503: 19-23, 30). They
admitted, however, that Jones said he was a Utah resident, had a Utah license, voted in Utah,
and had his family home in Kanab (T 503: 20-21). The court ruled that Jones qualified as
a Utah resident and denied the motion (T 503: 4, 6, 31-31; BR 292-93; CR 474-75).
Defendants have not established that the trial court committed obvious error in its ruling. See
Davis v. Grand County Service Area, 905 P.2d 888, 892 (Utah App. 1995) (treating a posttrial motion raising a voir dire challenge as a plain error argument).
Juror Wendy Harris was Juror Blane Harris' sister-in-law (T 494: 78). The court
throughly questioned them about their relationship (T 494: 77-79,103). Both Harrises

19

The trial court found that the transcript incorrectly attributed another juror's
statement that he had spoken to two witnesses about the case to Jones (T 494: 86; T 503:
16-19). Nevertheless, on appeal, defendants inappropriately claim that Jones made this
statement (Br.Aplt. at 26).
38

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

indicated that they could and would exercise independent judgment (T 494: 78-79). Blane
Harris suggested, in jest, that if they disagreed, they would have "a brawl" (T 494: 79). See
Addendum D.
Additionally, Wendy's husband worked for the county road department, her brotherin-law (Blane's brother) was a Kane County jailer, and her brother was a Kane City police
officer (T 494: 40, 75,117). Both Harrises were asked if they would credit a police officer
over another witness (T 494: 75-77). Both responded that they would give equal weight to
all witnesses (T 494: 77-78). Blane also explained that he was on a "mission" when the fire
occurred and did not really know "the people here in Kanab that well" (T 494: 117-18).
Defense counsel affirmatively waived any for-cause challenges to either Harris and did not
remove either with a peremptory challenge (T 494: 118-19, 147-148). Again, counsel's
actions preclude a finding of obvious error.
(C) Defendants Have Not Established Prejudicial Error.
Even if defendants could establish any obvious error in the voir dire of the four jurors,
they can not establish prejudice because they failed to use available peremptory challenges
to remove them. See State v. Wach, 2001 UT 35, f 36 & n.3 (reaffirming holding in State
v. Baker, 935 503, 510 (Utah 1997), that available peremptories must be used to "cure"
improper denial of a for-cause challenge). Moreover, there is no showing that any of the
jurors who sat were partial. See id. at f 36 (reaffirming holding of State v. Menzies, 889
P.2d 393, 398 (Utah 1994), that prejudice does not accrue from errors in voir dire unless the
complaining party demonstrates that a seated juror was "partial or incompetent").
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Consequently, defendants' plain error argument fails. See Bloomfield, 2003 UT App 3, %
7 (recognizing that plain error requires a showing of prejudice).
POINT III
DEFENDANTS FAIL TO ESTABLISH THAT THE TRIAL COURT
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FINDING THAT THE EXCHANGES
BETWEEN TWO JURORS AND THE PROSECUTOR'S WIFE WERE
EITHER BRIEF COMMON COURTESY OR RELATED TO A
COMMUNITY MUSICAL PRODUCTION AND, THEREFORE,
INSUFFICIENT TO JUSTIFY A NEW TRIAL
Defendants moved for a new trial on the basis that jurors had improperly conversed
with the prosecutor's wife during trial (BR 255-77; CR 426-50). The trial court conducted
an evidentiary hearing during which the identified jurors and the prosecutor's wife testified
(T 503:23-61; T 504:2-21). Based on the evidence, the court concluded that one juror, who
did not know the prosecutor's wife, may have had a brief common courtesy exchange with
her over the drinking fountain (BR 291-92; CR 473-74). Another juror approached the
prosecutor's wife to tell her that they were both involved in a community musical (BR 291;
CR 473). The court concluded the exchanges were insufficient to justify a new trial (BR
290-91; CR 473-74). See Addendum E (Order Denying Motion for New Trial). The court's
denial was a proper exercise of its discretion based on a correct application of the law. See
State v. Martin, 2002 UT 34, J 45, 44 PJd 805 (recognizing that a denial of a motion for
new trial will not be reversed "absent a clear abuse of discretion," unless the "legal standards
applied by the trial court in denying the motion" are erroneous as a matter of law).
It is well-settled that "any contact between a juror and witness, party, or court
personnel that is more than a brief and incidental contact results in the attachment of a
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rebuttable presumption of prejudice because it has the effect of 'breeding a sense of
familiarity that could clearly affect the juror's judgment as to credibility/" State v. Tenney,
913 P.2d 750, 757 (Utah App.), cert denied, 923 P.2d 693 (Utah 1996) (citation omitted)
(emphasis in original). But a rebuttable presumption of prejudice does not attach if the
contact is "between a juror and an outsider under circumstances unrelated to the
proceedings." Id. "In such a case, there is a presumption that the jurors have behaved
properly, and it is the defendant's burden to provide some definite proof of misconduct and
that the said misconduct is prejudicial." Id. (citation omitted).
The inquiry is "a fact-driven exercise that will depend upon the circumstances of the
case." State v. McKeen, 685 A.2d 1090,1092 (Vt. 1996). "Because the trial judge develops
a relationship with the jury during the course of the trial, he or she is in the best position" to
determine the impact of any contact. Id. "Consequently, every reasonable presumption in
its favor is accorded to the ruling below." Id. at 1093. Accord State v. Jonas, 793 P.2d 902,
906 (Utah App.) (presuming that the trial court properly exercises its discretion "unless the
record clearly shows the contrary"), cert denied, 804 P.2d 1232 (Utah 1990) .20
Below, defendants conceded that the prosecutor's wife was not court personnel, but
an "outsider," a trial spectator (T 503: 24). Consequently, as they recognized in the hearing,

20

The fact-sensitive nature of the inquiry compels an appellant to marshal the facts
in support of the denial. See Subsection 1(A), supra. Defendants acknowledge the
hearing facts, but do not "ferret out a fatal flaw in the evidence"as required under the
marshaling standard. See Neely, 2002 UT App 189, f 12 & n.l. This justifies summary
rejection of their claim. Alternatively, they fail on the merits.
41
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propriety is presumed and the burden is on defendants to establish prejudicial misconduct (T
503: 57-60; T 504: 16-19).
Wendy Harris and the prosecutor's wife, Rebecca Winchester, testified in the hearing
on the motion for new trial. They agreed they did not know each other at the time of the trial
and neither specifically recalled any conversation with the other (T 503:40-42; T 504: 5-7).
Ms. Winchester acknowledged that was possible, as defendants alleged, that they may have
briefly exchange a common courtesy at the drinking fountain (id.). They did not discuss the
trial (T 503: 54-55). Based on the evidence, the trial court concluded that no impermissible
contact occurred (BR 291; CR 473; T 504: 20-21). See Addendum E.
Cheryl Brown and Ms. Winchester testified concerning their conversation. The two
knew each other prior to trial through mutual community activities (T 503:42-43; T 504: 914). They agreed that on one occasion during the trial, Ms. Brown approached Ms.
Winchester to discuss their mutual involvement in a community musical (id.).21 Brown
represented that the conversation was no different than past conversations she may have had
with Ms. Winchester when both were involved in community activities (T 504: 10). Both
agreed that nothing beyond Ms. Brown's anticipated costumes for the Wizard of Oz
production was discussed (T 503:43; T 504: 10,15). Both insisted that no aspect of the trial
was discussed (T 503: 54-55; T 504: 12). The court concluded that the conversation was

21

Ms. Winchester testified this only occurred once (T 503: 46); Ms. Brown
remembered this conversation specifically, but was unsure if she may have greeted Ms.
Winchester in common courtesy on some other occasion (T 504: 14).
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"insufficient" to justify a new trial because it did not impact the "objectivity or fairness of
the jury" (BR 291; CR 473; T 504: 20-21)..
The court's ruling is correct. The Harris contact was de minius and clearly did not call
into question the impartiality of the jury. See Jonas, 793 P.2d at 909 (recognizing that
common courtesy exchanges are expected and unavoidable during a trial). The Brown
contact was more substantial, but amounted to no more than a social contact with an outsider.
As such, it is not prohibited. See Tenney, 913 P.2d at 757. Moreover, even if it were
prohibited, no possibility of prejudice resulted: the conversation did not relate to the trial.
See Tenney, 913 P.2d at 758 (finding discussion of case with outsider improper, but not so
prejudicial as to require a new trial); State v. Durand, 569 P.2d 1107, 1109 (Utah 1977)
(concluding that social conversation between jurors and officers who were witnesses in the
case was improper, but not prejudicial). Consequently, the court did not clearly abuse its
discretion in denying the motion for new trial.
POINTIV
THE CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE FULLY SUPPORTS
DEFENDANTS' CONVICTIONS FOR AGGRAVATED ARSON
Defendants contend their convictions must be reversed because the State's expert did
not know what ignition source was used to start thefire(Br.Aplt. at 39-41). Defendants also
argue their convictions cannot stand because Michael Leighton was not "investigated and
eliminated"as a suspect (Br.Aplt at 42-44). Neither argument supports reversal.

43
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(A) The Sufficiency Challenge Should Not Be Reviewed Because Defendants
Fail to Marshal the Evidence in Support of the Verdicts and Have Not Fully
Preserved Their Challenge.
A jury verdict will only be reversed for insufficient evidence if the evidence, viewed
in the light most favorable to the verdict, is "sufficiently inconclusive or inherently
improbable such that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the
defendant committed the crime for which he or she was convicted."' State v. Hamilton, 2003
UT 22,118 (quoting State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1212 (Utah 1993)). In attacking a jury
verdict, the appellant bears "an extremely heavy burden" to thoroughly marshal the evidence.
Julian v. State, 2002 UT 61, f 16, 52 P.3d 1168. Here, defendants fail to met that burden.
Defendants' Statement of Facts consists of two pages (Br.Aplt. at 5-6). Only one
record citation relates to the trial, and that is to the prosecutor's opening argument (Br.Aplt.
at 6, citing T494:182-84). The other record citations are to the pretrial suppression hearing.
Defendants' factual recitation does not fairly represent the evidence presented during their
seven-day jury trial. Compare State fs Statement of Facts, supra. Summary affirmance is,
therefore, justified. See Lucero, 2002 UT App 135, % 11.
Moreover, defendants preserved only of their two grounds for claiming the evidence
is insufficient. See Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ^J 16 (requiring an appellant to preserve a
sufficiency challenge by "proper motion or objection"). Defendants did move to dismiss on
the ground that the prosecution failed to establish precisely how the fire was ignited (T 497:
965-967). However, they did not move to dismiss on the ground that the evidence pointed
to Leighton rather than them, although they did argue in closing that Leighton, "should be
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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considered suspicious" (T 500:45-47).n This tangential closing argument does not preserve
this portion of defendants' current legal challenge. See id. Consequently, the State does not
address it.
(B) The Trial Court Properly Denied the Motion to Dismiss Because Proof
of the Precise Means Used to Ignite an Intentional Fire is Not Required.
Even if the merits of defendants' preserved claim is considered, the evidence fully
supports the jury verdicts.
Defendants' sufficiency argument is based on a false premise.

Contrary to

defendants' assertion, the prosecution was not required to prove the precise method used to
ignite the fire, only that fire was intentionally used to damage a habitable building. As the
trial court correctly noted, "it is very common in arson cases that you don't have [an]
eyewitness that somebody lighted a match, so I think you draw those inferences from all the
other facts" (T 497: 967). See State v. Span, 819 P.2d 329,332-33 (Utah 1991) (upholding
"close"and "entirely" circumstantial arson conviction); State v. Scheel, 823 P.2d 470,472
n.3 (Utah App. 1991) (recognizing circumstantial nature of arson cases).
Moreover, the elements of aggravated arson are that (1) a habitable structure (2) was
intentionally damaged (3) by means of a fire. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-103(1 )(a). Proof
Leighton, who was then incarcerated in the Utah State prison, testified that
while a fireman, he abused drugs and was subsequently convicted in Nevada of a drug
offense (T 497: 864,908-10). He also admitted that in 1999, he pled guilty to
burglarizing some storage units in Kanab (T 497: 867-68, 911). His only connection to
the Frontier fire is that he was one of the firemen who responded to the alarm and was
later left alone for a few hours to watch the burned premises (T 495: 314; T 497: 901-02,
913-14). Leighton invoked the Fifth Amendment when asked if he stole any cash from
the restaurant's cash register during his watch (T 497: 867). In returning the guilty
verdicts, the jury necessarily rejected that the evidence pointed to Leighton.
45
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of the manner of ignition is not required, but may be relevant as additional circumstantial
evidence of the intended result. See Scheel, 823 P.2d at 472-73 (recognizing critical element
of intent to cause damage by means of a fire, but not requiring additional proof of the specific
means by which the fire was set). In sum, the trial court properly refused to dismiss the case.
(C) The Circumstantial Evidence Establishes that the Fire Was Intentional
Even though the precise means used to ignite the fire was never determined, the
evidence in this case fully supports the jury's conclusion that the fire was intentional.
The State's expert determined that accelerant was used in the attic to more quickly
spread the fire which began around the attic access (T 495: 501). This conclusion was based
on the degree of carbonization in the attic and the main floor bathroom wall, the mid-wall
bum pattern in the bathroom, the high temperature and intensity of the fire, the horizontal
bum pattern across the attic floor, and the condition of the wood surrounding the attic access
(T 495: 482-86.490-98,501-03, 503-06, 510; T 496: 585-87, 597-98). See Span, 819 P.2d
at 332 (recognizing validity of expert opinion based on bum patterns and smell of accelerant,
even though subsequent testing did not confirm presence of accelerant); State v. Schultz,
2002 UT App 366, If 11,16 & 33,58 P.3d 879 (recognizing validity of expert opinion based
on same factors, plus canine accelerant alert, even in absence of laboratory confirmation of
accelerant); State v. Morehouse, 748 P.2d 217, 218 (Utah App.) (recognizing validity of
expert opinion based on same factors, plus visual but not laboratory-verified presence of
gasoline), cert denied, 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988). In rendering his opinion that the fire was
intentional, Borg took into account the natural fuel load in the attic and physically examined
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and handled the attic wiring and electrical panel to eliminate accidental causes for the fire
(T 495: 467-70, 503-06; T 496: 584-85, 593-98, 600-06, 638-43, 654-55, 673-74). See id.
Based on his personal "hands-on" examination of the premises just hours after the fire
was extinguished, Borg was positive that the Frontierfirewas intentionally set (T 495: 665,
676). Unlike defendants' experts, Borg also appropriately considered the extensive evidence
of arson preparation and verified presence of accelerant in the basement (T 495:446-49,45463; T 496: 620-27, 656-57). He just could not determine the precise means (match, lighter,
etc.) by which the accelerant was ignited in the attic (T 496: 616, 676). See Scheel, 823
P.2d at 473 n.4 (affirming aggravated arson conviction where expert opined that fire was
intentional, but could not determine the precise method of ignition).
The fact that the parties' experts conflicted in their opinions does not provide a basis
to overturn the jury verdict. See Span, 819 P.2d at 332 n.l (upholding arson conviction
despite conflicting expert opinions on whether fire was intentionally set). The jury was
entitled to accept one expert opinion over the other or reject both and rely on their own
evaluation of the evidence. See Weber Basin Water Conservancy District v. Skeen, 328
P.2d 730,80-81 (Utah 1958) (recognizing jury's prerogative in weighing expert testimony).
Here, the jury's rejection of the defense experts' opinions was warranted. The defense
experts only examined the premises months after the fire and refused to consider all the
evidence found at the scene at the time of thefire(T 498: 1207,1229-30; T 499: 154,164).
Additionally, the electrical expert agreed that an electricalfirecould result from intentional
manipulation of the wires (T 498: 1221 -22). The arson expert admitted that it would be rare
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for an accidental electrical fire to occur at the same time and place as preparations for an
arson fire (T 499: 173). See State v. Showaker, 721 P.2d 892, 893 (Utah 1986) (upholding
jury's rejection of claim that it was "pure coincidence" that fire was set in same manner as
"joking" threat). In sum, the evidence fully supports the verdicts. See State v. Nickles, 728
P.2d 123,125-26(Utah 1986) (holding that evidence ofarson was "substantial" and "beyond
a reasonable doubt" where defendants excluded others from access to their house, claimed
to be on an out-of-state trip, removed personal belongings and papers from the house, fire
investigators found accelerant-soaked papers and "trailers" in the bedrooms, and the burn
patterns indicated the use of an accelerant).
CONCLUSION
Defendants' convictions for aggravated arson should be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this c$$

day of May, 2003.

MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Attorney General •
CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS
Assistant Attorney General
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Addendum A
UTAH CONST.,

art. VIII, §§ 1,5,11

UTAH R. APP. P. 24(a)
UTAH R. CRIM. P. 18
UTAH
UTAH
UTAH
UTAH
UTAH
UTAH
UTAH
UTAH

CODE ANN.
CODE ANN.
CODE ANN.
CODE ANN.
CODE ANN.
CODE ANN.
CODE ANN.
CODE ANN.

§ 76-3-402 (1999)
§ 76-6-101 (1999)
§ 76-6-103 (1999)
§ 77-1-3 (1999)
§ 77-23-201 (1999)
§ 78-5-101 (2002)
§ 78-5-106 (2002)
§ 78-7-17.5 (2002)
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Exhibit No. 23
DAMAGE TO ROOF
(T 495:486-87)

Exhibit No. 21
ATTIC ACCESS LOOKING
DOWN INTO MAIN FLOOR
(T 495:483-84)

Exhibit No. 22
ATTIC LOOKING DOWN
INTO MAIN FLOOR BATHROOM
(T 495:485-86)
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Addendum C
Search Warrant & Affidavit
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Re Motion to Suppress
(BR 167-172; CR 295-300)
Order Denying Motion to Suppress (BR 173-75; CR 302-03)
Order on Motion to Quash Search Warrant and Suppress Evidence
Seized (CR 275-277)
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COLIN R. WINCHESTER [4696]
KANE COUNTY ATTORNEY
ERIC D. PETERSEN [7424J
DEPUTY KANE COUNTY ATTORNEY
76 North Main Street
Kanab, Utah 84741
Telephone: (435) 644-5278
Facsimile: (435) 644-2281

IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR KANE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,

)
)

)
Plaintiff,
v.
JOHN DOE,
Defendant.

SEARCH WARRANT

)
)
)

)

Case No. 981600031

)
)
)
)

JUDGE DAVID L. MOWER

THE STATE OF UTAH TO ANY SHERIFF, CONSTABLE, MARSHAL, POLICE
OFFICER, OR ANY OTHER PEACE OFFICER WITHIN KANE COUNTY:
Proof by affidavit under oath having been made this day
before me by ALAN ALLDREDGE that he has reason to believe, and I
am satisfied that there is probable cause to believe, that in or
about the real property that is operated as the Frontier Bar-B-Q
& Steak Restaurant (main floor restaurant and basement living
quarters), which property is located within Kanab City, Kane
County, State of Utah, and is more particularly described as 1143

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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(

South Highway 89A, there is presently certain property or
evidence, which property or evidence was unlawfully acquired or
unlawfully possessed, and consists of any item or constitutes
evidence of arson or reckless burning, possessed or left by a
party to the illegal conduct,
YOU ARE THEREFORE COMMANDED to make immediate search of the
above-described real property, including the curtilage and all
outbuildings and personal property located on or about the
curtilage.

Because the owners/operators are out of town, you

need not serve this warrant upon anyone prior to making the
search.

The search may be conducted at any time during the day.

You are to prepare a written inventory of the property or
evidence seized and make a verified return of the warrant to the
Court, together with the written inventory, stating the place
where the seized property is being held.

You shall be

responsible for the safekeeping and maintenance of the property
until the further order of the Court.

DATED this 24th day of March, 1998.

GERRY H. HOYTX
Magistrate
Time of Issuance:

//:J/X

O^*M-
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COLIN R. WINCHESTER [4696]
KANE COUNTY ATTORNEY
ERIC D. PETERSEN [7424]
DEPUTY KANE COUNTY ATTORNEY
76 North Main Street
Kanab, Utah 84741
Telephone: (435) 644-5278
Facsimile: (435) 644-2281

IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR KANE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,

)
)

)
Plaintiff,
v.

)
)
)

)

JOHN DOE,

AFFIDAVIT OF ALAN ALLDREDGE

Case No. 981600031

)

Defendant.

STATE OF UTAH

)

JUDGE DAVID L. MOWER

)

COUNTY OF KANE )
ALAN ALLDREDGE, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:
1.

I am a certified firefighter, and am the Chief of the

Kanab City Fire Department.
2,

At approximately 4:15 a.m. on March 24, 1998, a fire

was observed at the Frontier Bar-B-Q & Steak Restaurant, located
at 1143 South Highway 89A, Kanab, Kane County, Utah.
4.

The fire was first observed by Kanab resident Dave

Winkleman, who went to the residence of Robert Schafer,
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turn called Kane County Dispatch.
3.

Prior to the time firefighters arrived, Dave Winkleman

and Kanab City Police Officer Brett Smith entered the building to
ensure that no one was inside.

The basement of the building is

purportedly used by the owners of the business as a residence.
No one was located inside the building.
4.

The fire caused substantial damage to the roof and

dining area located in the southwest corner of the building.

The

fire also caused smoke damage throughout the building.
5.

The suppression of the fire caused water damage

throughout the building.
6.

In the two basement bedrooms, located on the west side

of the building, drawers had been removed from dressers and
stacked up in a pyramid fashion, much like a person would stack
wood for a campfire or a bonfire.
7.

Parts of the drywall ceiling above the stacks of

drawers had been cut and torn away, exposing the floor joists.
The drywall pieces had been removed from the building, and as of
the time this Affidavit was executed, have not been located.
8.

There is a strong smell of solvent, such as paint

thinner, paint remover, or turpentine, throughout the basement.
9.

There is a storage closet in the basement, used as a

food pantry for the restaurant.

The storage closet/food pantry

is located on the west side of the building, between the two
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bedrooms.
10.

The solvent smell is stronger in the storage

closet/food pantry than it is throughout the rest of the
basement.
11.

Part of the drywall ceiling of the storage closet/food

pantry has been cut and torn away, exposing the floor joists.
The drywall pieces had been removed from the building, and as of
the time this Affidavit was executed, have not been located.

On

the top shelf of the storage closet/food pantry, just beneath the
removed drywall, packages of restaurant style napkins have been
placed at intervals, rather than stacked neatly together.
12.

The purported owners of the business, Dorothy Carpenter

and Robert Beltran, are, according to Kanab resident Joe Johnson,
in the Phoenix or Mesa area, and have been out of town for
several days.

Mr, Johnson is an auto body repairman/ mechanic,

and is working on Ms. Carpenter's 1991 Camaro.
13.

In the restaurant kitchen, which is located in the

southeast portion of the main floor, there is a 1/2 gallon
container of orange juice on a table or countertop, with a small
amount of orange juice still present.

Located next to the orange

juice container is a coffee cup filled approximately 1/2 full of
orange juice. At approximately 7:00 a.m. on the morning of March
24, 1998, the orange juice in the container and the orange juice
in the coffee cup were cold to the touch.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

3

14.

There are no apparent signs of forced entry into the

building, except those entries made by firefighters and law
enforcement personnel.

FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NOT.

DATED this 24th of March, 1998.

ALAN ALLDREDGE
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 24th day of March,
1998.
^...
/&~Wy
fe>-\iV

H<r-Sy

COUH ' * ^ C K £ 3 T ^
pr.nm -VJ3JC'SVJz x L-fiW

NOTARY PUBLIC

S.»1TU«EC!TY.UT 84121
coaa. EXPIRES 12-n-aa
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IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR KANE COUNTY
STATEOFUTAH

RETURN OF SEARCH WARRANT
Criminal No. 981600031
The property listed below was taken from the premises located and described as a business
and residence located at 1143 South Hwy 89A Kanab, Utah, by virtue of a search warrant
dated March 24,1998 and executed by Gerry H. Hoyt, Magistrate of the above entitled court.
Item 01

One pair of Nike tennis shoes I south outside porch

Item 02

One pair of Nike tennis shoes I inside of south door

Item 03

Coffee mug • kitchen counter

Item 04

Yellowflashlight- kitchen counter

Item#5

One piece of dry wall-bed of GMCmck

Item 06

One piece of dry wall « southwest basement bedroom ceiling

Item 07

Newspaper - shelf of basement middle bedroom

Item 08

Cardboard sample • basement pantry

Item 09

Red punt-southwest

Item 010

Two photographs - southwest basement bedroom dresser

Item 011

Fluid Sample • outside shed

Item 012

One gallon paint thinner - outside shed

Item 013

Clothing sample • southwest basement bedroom dresser

Item 014

Clothing sample • northwest basement bedroom dresser

Item 015

One receipt - northwest basement bedroom dresser

basement bedroom dresser

All items listed above are being held in the Kanab City Police Department evidence locker.
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I Sergeant Thomas C. Cram, by whom the Warrant was executed, do swear the above
listed inventory contains a true and detailed account of all the property taken by me under
the warrant on March 24, 1998.
All of the property taken by me by virtue of said Warrant will be retained in my
custody subject to the order of this court or of any other court in which the offense in respect
to which the property or things taken is triable.

G Cram, Sergeant
Kanab City Police Department

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 26th day of March, 1998

I
L2L

Notary
V A * > • '''/•'
v

-^us."--

/
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Commission Expiration Date
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COLIN R. WINCHESTER [4696]
KANE COUNTY ATTORNEY
J. CHRISTIAN RASMUSSEN [8267]
DEPUTY KANE COUNTY ATTORNEY
34 North Main Street
Kanab, Utah 84741
Telephone: (435) 644-5278
Facsimile: (435) 644-8156

IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR KANE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW RE
MOTION TO SUPPRESS

v.
Case No. 981600101
ROBERT BELTRAN,
JUDGE K. L. McIFF
Defendant.

This matter came before the Court on October 29, 1999
pursuant to Defendant's motion seeking re-consideration of the
previously denied motion to suppress.

The State of Utah was

represented by the Kane County Attorney, Colin R. Winchester.
The Defendant was present and was represented by counsel, John E.
Hummel.
Court.

The parties argued their respective positions before the
The Court, having reviewed the file, having reviewed the

transcript of the preliminary hearing, having heard the testimony
offered at the original motion to suppress, and having heard and
STATE OF UTAH v. ROBERT BELTRAN
Case No. 981600101
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considered the arguments of counsel, now therefore, enters the
following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

On March 24, 1998, at approximately 4:15 a.m., a fire

was seen at the Frontier Bar-B-Q restaurant ("the restaurant") in
Kanab, Utah.
2.

The restaurant building serves as both a commercial

restaurant and a residence, the residence being located in the
basement.
3.

Firefighters from the Kanab City Fire Department

arrived at the fire at approximately 4:30 a.m.

Fire Chief Alan

Alldredge was the first firefighter on the scene.
4.

The fire was located mainly in the restaurant's roof

structure.
5.

In the process of checking the premises for persons

and/or other fires, firefighters went into the basement of the
restaurant.

They saw that dresser drawers had been removed from

their dressers and stacked in piles under at least two locations
where drywall had been removed from the basement ceiling,
exposing the floor joists of the main floor.

They also saw that

boards had been placed on the basement floor, running from one
stack of dresser drawers to the other stack(s).

STATE OF UTAH v. ROBERT BELTRAN
Case No. 981600101
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•76.

The firefighters notified Chief Alldredge of the things

they had seen in the basement, and Chief Alldredge made a cursory
inspection of the basement.
7.

The county attorney was called to the scene at

approximately 6:30 a.m., and together with one or more
firefighters, made a cursory inspection of the basement and the
main floor of the restaurant.
8.

The county attorney then went to his office and

prepared an affidavit and a search warrant.

The affidavit was

executed by Chief Alldredge, and the search warrant was then
presented to, and issued by, a magistrate.

The affidavit

described the items seen by the firefighters and the county
attorney in some detail, but the search warrant described the
items to be seized only as "evidence of arson or reckless
burning."
9.

The search warrant was executed later that same day by

Chief Alldredge, Sgt. Tom Cram of the Kanab City Police
Department, and Lynn Borg, Chief Investigator of the Utah State
Fire Marshal's Office.

Sgt. Cram did not read the search warrant

before it was executed.

STATE OF UTAH v. ROBERT BELTRAN
Case No. 981600101
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10.

During the execution of the search warrant, photographs

were taken, videotapes were made, and the following items were
seized:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(11)
(12)
(13)
(14)
(15)

a
a
a
a
a
a
a
a
a
a
a
a

pair of Nike tennis shoes
pair of Nike tennis shoes
coffee mug
yellow flashlight
piece of drywall from the bed of Mr. Beltran's truck
piece of drywall from the basement
newspaper from a shelf in the basement
fluid sample from the outside shed
gallon of paint thinner from the outside shed
clothing sample from the basement
clothing sample from the basement
receipt from the basement

Some photographs were taken, and some videotape footage was
shot, from the bucket of a bucket truck, looking down into the
damaged roof of the restaurant.

The bucket truck had been

brought onto the premises by the firefighters.
11.

After the initial search pursuant to the search warrant

was completed, another search was made and the following items
were seized:
(8) a cardboard sample from the basement
(9) a red purse from the basement
(10) two photographs from the basement
12.

Item.(5) #

the piece of drywall from the bed of Mr.

Beltran f s truck, was first seen by Captain Mike Royce of the Utah
Highway Patrol.

Captain Royce is a pilot who had flown Chief

Investigator Borg to Kanab.

The piece of drywall was in plain

view.
STATE OF UTAH v. ROBERT BELTRAN
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CONLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The initial entries into the restaurant and the

basement by the firefighters, Chief Alldredge, and the county
attorney were either for the purpose of extinguishing the fire or
investigating the cause of the blaze. All such entries were
completed within a reasonable time. None of those entries
violate the constitutional prohibitions against unreasonable
searches and seizures, as per Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499
(1978), and Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287 (1984).
2.

The search warrant included suitable words of reference

to the affidavit executed in support thereof

See State v.

Anderson, 701 P.2d 1099 (Utah 1985).
3.

Because the search warrant was executed by the signer

of the affidavit in support thereof, the lack of specificity in
the search warrant may be bolstered by the specificity in the
affidavit.
4.

See State v. Anderson, 701 P.2d 1099 (Utah 1985).

When read together, the affidavit and the search

warrant contain sufficient specificity of the items to be seized.
5.

The search warrant was also executed by Chief

Investigator Borg, who has sufficient expertise to know and
understand what items constituting "evidence of arson or reckless
burning" fife p.

£iUV\
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6.

The executors of the search warrant acted pursuant to a

valid search warrant, and the fruits of the search are protected
by the Leon doctrine.
7.

Items (8), (9), and (10) should be suppressed because

they were seized subsequent to the initial execution of the
search warrant.
8.

Items (1), (2), (3), and (4) should be suppressed

because they would not ordinarily constitute '"evidence of arson
or reckless burning."
.. 9«.:

Item (5) and the videotape and photographs taken from

the bucket truck should not be suppressed because all are subject
to the plain view doctrine.

DATED this f^2r day of December, 19-99.

BY THE COURT:

STATE OF UTAH v. ROBERT BELTRAN
Case No. 981600101
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COLIN R. WINCHESTER [4696]
KANE COUNTY ATTORNEY
J. CHRISTIAN RASMUSSEN [8267]
DEPUTY KANE COUNTY ATTORNEY
34 North Main Street
Kanab, Utah 84741
Telephone: (435) 644-5278
Facsimile: (435) 644-8156

IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR KANE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

)
)

ORDER DENYING
MOTION TO SUPPRESS

v.
Case No. 981600101

ROBERT BELTRAN,

JUDGE K. L. McIFF
Defendant.

This matter came before the Court on October 29, 1999
pursuant to Defendant's motion seeking re-consideration of the
previously denied motion to suppress.

The State of Utah was

represented by the Kane County Attorney, Colin R. Winchester.
The Defendant was present and was represented by counsel, John E.
Hummel.
Court.

The parties argued their respective positions before the
The Court reviewed the file, reviewed the transcript of

the preliminary hearing, heard the testimony offered at the
original motion to suppress, heard and considered the arguments
STATE OF UTAH v. ROBERT BELTRAN
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of counsel, and previously entered its Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law.
BASED ON THE FOREGOING, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND
DECREED AS FOLLOWS:
- 1.

Items (1), (2), (3), (4), (8), (9), and (10) are hereby

suppressed.
2.

All other items, including but not limited to, seized

items, photographs and videotapes, are not suppressed.

DATED this

day of December, 1999.

BY THE COURT:

STATE OP UTAH v. ROBERT
DigitizedBELTRAN
by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Case No. 981600101

Exhibit No. 6
DRESSER IN
CARPENTER'S
BEDROOM
(T 495:454-55)

Exhibit No. 10
DRESSER IN
BELTRAN'S
BEDROOM
(T 495:459-60)

Exhibit No. 7
"TRAILERS" IN HALLWAY
(T 495:455-456)
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ARTICLE Vin
JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
Section
1. [Judicial powers — Courts.]
2. [Supreme court — Chief justice — Declaring law unconstitutional — Justice unable to participate.)
3. [Jurisdiction of Supreme Court.)
4. [Rule-making power of Supreme Court — Judges pro
tempore — Regulation of practice of law.)
5. [Jurisdiction of district court and other courts — Right of
appeal.]
6. [Number of judges of district court and other courts —
Divisions.)
7. [Qualifications of justices and judges.]
8. [Vacancies — Nominating commissions — Senate approval.]
9. [Judicial retention elections.]
10. [Restrictions on justices and judges.]
11. [Judges of courts not of record.]
12. [Judicial Council — Chief justice as administrative officer
— Legal counsel]
13. [Judicial Conduct Commission.]
14. [Compensation of justices and judges.]
15. [Mandatory retirement]
16. [Public prosecutors.]
17 to 28. [Repealed.]
Section 1. [Judicial powers — Courts.]
The judicial power of the state shall be vested in a supreme
court, in a trial court of general jurisdiction known as the
district court, and in such other courts as the Legislature by
statute may establish. The Supreme Court, the district court,
and such other courts designated by statute shall be courts of
record. Courts not of record shall also be established by
Statute.

1984 (2nd S.S.)

Sec. 5. [Jurisdiction of district court and other courts
— Right of appeal.]
The district court shall have original jurisdiction in all
matters except as limited by this constitution or by statute,
and power to issue all extraordinary writs. The district court
shall have appellate jurisdiction as provided by statute. The
jurisdiction of all other courts, both original and appellate,
shall be provided by statute. Except for matters filed originally
with the Supreme Court, there shall be in all cases an appeal
of right from the court of original jurisdiction to a court with
appellate jurisdiction over the cause.
1984 (2nd S.S.)

Sec; 11. [Judges of courts not of record.]
Judges of courts not of record shall be selected in a manner,
for a term, and with qualifications provided by statute. However, no qualification may be imposed which requires judges of
courts not of record to be admitted to practice law. The number
of judges of courts not of record shall be provided by statute.
1984 (2nd S.S.)
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Rule 24. Briefs.
(a) Brief of the appellant The brief of the appellant shall
contain under appropriate headings and in the order indicated:
(V A complete list of all parties to the proceeding in the
court or agency whose judgment or order is sought to be
reviewed, except where the caption of the case on appeal
contains the names of all such parties. The list should be set
out on a separate page which appears immediately inside the
cover.
(2) A table of contents, including the contents of the addendum, with page references.
(3) A table of authorities with cases alphabetically arranged
and with parallel citations, rules, statutes and other authorities cited, with references to the pages of the brief where they
are cited.
(4) A brief statement showing the jurisdiction of the appellate court.
(5) A statement of the issues presented for review, including
for each issue: the standard of appellate review with supporting authority; and
(A) citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved in the trial court; or
(B) a statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue
not preserved in the trial court.
(6) Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules,
and regulations whose interpretation is determinative of the
appeal or of central importance to the appeal shall be set out
verbatim with the appropriate citation. If the pertinent part of
the provision is lengthy, the citation alone will suffice, and the
provision shall be set forth in an addendum to the brief under
paragraph (11) of this rule.
(7) A statement of the case. The statement shall first indicate briefly the nature of the case, the course of proceedings,
and its disposition in the court below. A statement of the facts
relevant to the issues presented for review shall follow. All
statements of fact and references to the proceedings below
shall be supported by citations to the record in accordance
with paragraph (e) of this rule.
(8) Summary of arguments. The summary of arguments,
suitably paragraphed, shall be a succinct condensation of the
arguments actually made in the body of the brief. It shall not
be a mere repetition of the heading under which the argument
is arranged.
(9) An argument. The argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues
presented, including the grounds for reviewing any issue not
preserved in the trial court, with citations to the authorities,
statutes, and parts of the record relied on. A party challenging
a fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that
supports the challenged finding.
(10) A short conclusion stating the precise relief sought
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(11) An addendum to the brief or a statement that no
addendum is necessary under this paragraph. The addendum
shall be bound as part of the brief unless doing so makes the
brief unreasonably thick. If the addendum is bound separately, the addendum shall contain a table of contents. The
addendum shall contain a copy of:
(A) any constitutional provision, statute, rule, or regulation
of central importance cited in the brief but not reproduced
verbatim in the brief;
(B) in cases being reviewed on certiorari, a copy of the Court
of Appeals opinion; in all cases any court opinion of central
importance to the appeal but not available to the court as part
of a regularly published reporter service; and
(C) those parts of the record on appeal that are of central
importance to the determination of the appeal, such as the
challenged instructions, findings' of fact and conclusions of
law, memorandum decision, the transcript of the court's oral
decision, or the contract or document subject to construction.
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Rule 18. Selection of jury.
(a) The judge shall determine the method of selecting the
jury and notify the parties at a pretrial conference or otherwise prior to trial. The following procedures for selection are
not exclusive.
(1) Strike and replace method. The court shall summon the
number of the jurors that are to try the cause plus such an
additional number as will allow for any alternates, for all
peremptory challenges permitted, and for all challenges for
cause granted. At the direction of the judge, the clerk shall call
jurors in random order. The judge may hear and determine
challenges for cause during the course of questioning or at the
end thereof. The judge may and, at the request of any party,
shall hear and determine challenges for cause outside the
hearing of the jurors. After each challenge for cause sustained,
another juror shall be called to fill the vacancy, and any such
new juror may be challenged for cause. When the challenges
for cause are completed, the clerk shall provide a list of the
jurors remaining, and each side, beginning with the prosecution, shall indicate thereon its peremptory challenge to one
juror at a time in regular turn, as the court may direct, until
all peremptory challenges are exhausted or waived. The clerk
shall then call the remaining jurors, or so many of them as
shall be necessary to constitute the jury, including any alternate jurors, and the persons whose names are so called shall
constitute the jury. If alternate jurors have been selected, the
last jurors called shall be the alternates, unless otherwise
ordered by the court prior to voir dire.
(2) Struck method. The court shall summon the number of
jurors that are to try the cause plus such an additional
number as will allow for any alternates, for all peremptory
challenges permitted and for all challenges for cause granted.
At the direction of the judge, the clerk shall call jurors in
random order. The judge may hear and determine challenges
for cause during the course of questioning or at the end
thereof. The judge may and, at the request of any party, shall
hear and determine challenges for cause outside the hearing
of the jurors. When the challenges for cause are completed, the
clerk shall provide a list of the jurors remaining, and each
side, beginning with the prosecution, shall indicate thereon its
peremptory challenge to one juror at a time in regular turn
until all peremptory challenges are exhausted or waived. The
clerk shall then call the remaining jurors, or so many of them
as shall be necessary to constitute the jury, including any
alternate jurors, and the persons whose names are so called
shall constitute the jury. If alternate jurors have been selected,
the last jurors called shall be the alternates, unless otherwise
ordered by the court prior to voir dire.
(3) In courts using lists of prospective jurors geherated in
random order by computer, the clerk may call the jurors in
that random order.
(b) The court may permit counsel or the defendant to
conduct the examination of the prospective jurors or may itself
conduct the examination. In the latter event, the court may
permit counsel or the defendant to supplement the examination by such further inquiry as it deems proper, or may itself
submit to the prospective jurors additional questions requested by counsel or the defendant. Prior to examining the
jurors, the court may make a preliminary statement of the
case. The court may permit the parties or their attorneys to
make a preliminary statement of the case, and notify the
parties in advance of trial.
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(c) A challenge may be made to the panel or to an individual
juror.
(1) The panel is a list of jurors called to serve at a particular
court or for the trial of a particular action. A challenge to the
panel is an objection made to all jurors summoned and may be
taken by either party.
(i) A challenge to the panel can be founded only on a
material departure from the procedure prescribed with respect to the selection, drawing, summoning and return of the
panel.
(ii) The challenge to the panel shall be taken before the jury
is sworn and shall be in writing or made upon the record. It
shall specifically set forth the facts constituting the grounds of
the challenge.
(iii) If a challenge to the panel is opposed by the adverse
party, a hearing may be had to try any question of fact upon
which the challenge is based. The jurors challenged, and any
other persons, may be called as witnesses at the hearing
thereon.
(iv) The court shall decide the challenge. If the challenge to
the panel is allowed, the court shall discharge the jury so far
as the trial in question is concerned. If a challenge is denied,
the court shall direct the selection of jurors to proceed.
(2) A challenge to an individual juror may be either peremptory or for cause. A challenge to an individual juror may be
made only before the jury is sworn to try the action, except the
court may, for good cause, permit it to be made after the juror
is sworn but before any of the evidence is presented. In
challenges for cause the rules relating to challenges to a panel
and hearings thereon shall apply. All challenges for cause
shall be taken first by the prosecution and then by the defense.
(d) A peremptory challenge is an objection to a juror for
which no reason need be given. In capital cases, each side is
entitled to 10 peremptory challenges. In other felony cases
each side is entitled to four peremptory challenges. In misdemeanor cases, each side is entitled to three peremptory
challenges. If there is more than one defendant the court may
allow the defendants additional peremptory challenges and
permit them to be exercised separately or jointly.
(e) A challenge for cause is an objection to a particular juror
and shall be heard and determined by the court. The juror
challenged and any other person may be examined as a
witness on the hearing of such challenge. A challenge for cause
may be taken on one or more of the following grounds. On its
own motion the court may remove a juror upon the same
grounds.
(1) want of any of the qualifications prescribed by law;
(2) any mental or physical infirmity which renders one
incapable of performing the duties of a juror;
(3) consanguinity or affinity within the fourth degree to the
person alleged to be injured by the offense charged!, or on
whose complaint the prosecution was instituted;
(4) the existence of any social, legal, business,fiduciaryor
other relationship between the prospective juror and any
party, witness or person alleged to have been victimized or
injured by the defendant, which relationship when viewed
objectively, would suggest to reasonable minds that the prospective juror would be unable or unwilling to return a verdict
which would be free of favoritism. A prospective juror shall not
be disqualified solely because the juror is indebted to or
employed by the state or a political subdivision thereof;
(5) having been or being the party adverse to the defendant
in a civil action, or having complained against or having been
accused by the defendant in a criminal prosecution;
(6) having served on the grand jury which found the indictment;
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(7) having served on a trial jury which has tried another
person for the particular offense charged;
(8) having been one of a jury formally sworn to try the same
charge, and whose verdict was set aside, or which was discharged without a verdict after the case was submitted to it;
(9) having served as a juror in a civil action brought against
the defendant for the act charged as an offense;
(10) if the offense charged is punishable with death, the
entertaining of opinions about the death penalty as would
preclude the juror from voting to impose the death penalty
following conviction or would require the juror to impose the
death penalty following conviction regardless of the facts;
(11) because the juror is or, within one year preceding, has
been engaged or interested in carrying on any business,
calling or employment, the carrying on of which is a violation
of law, where defendant is charged with a like offense;
(12) because the juror has been a witness, either for or
against the defendant on the preliminary examination or
before the grand jury;
(13) having formed or expressed an unqualified opinion or
belief as to whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty of the
offense charged; or
(14) conduct, responses, state of mind or other circumstances that reasonably lead the court to conclude the juror is
not likely to act impartially. No person may serve as a juror, if
challenged, unless the judge is convinced the juror can and
will act impartially and fairly.
(f) Peremptory challenges shall be taken first by the prosecution and then by the defense alternately. Challenges for
cause shall be completed before peremptory challenges are
taken.
(g) The court may direct that alternate jurors be impaneled.
Alternate jurors, in the order in which they are called, shall
replace jurors who, prior to the time the jury retires to
consider its verdict, become unable or disqualified to perform
their duties. The prosecution and defense shall each have one
additional peremptory challenge for each alternate juror to be
chosen. Alternate jurors shall be selected at the same time and
in the same manner, shall have the same qualifications, shall
be subject to the same examination and challenges, shall take
the same oath and shall have the same functions, powers, and
privileges as principal jurors. Except in bifurcated proceedings, an alternate juror who does not replace a principal juror
shall be discharged when the jury retires to consider its
verdict. The identity of the alternate jurors may be withheld
until the jurors begin deliberations.
(h) When the jury is selected an oath shall be administered
to the jurors, in substance, that they and each of them will
well and truly try the matter in issue between the parties, and
render a true verdict according to the evidence and the
instructions of the court.
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76-3-402. Conviction of lower degree of offense.
(1) If the court, having regard to the nature and circumstances of the offense of which the defendant was found guilty
and to the history and character of the defendant, concludes it
would be unduly harsh to record the conviction as being for
that degree of offense established by statute and to sentence
the defendant to an alternative normally applicable to that
offense, the court may unless otherwise specifically provided
by law enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower degree
of offense and impose sentence accordingly.
(2) If a conviction is for a third degree felony the conviction
is considered to be for a class A misdemeanor if:
(a) the judge designates the sentence to be for a class A
misdemeanor and the sentence imposed is within the
limits provided by law for a class A misdemeanor; or
(b) (i) the imposition of the sentence is stayed and the
defendant is placed on probation, whether committed
to jail as a condition of probation or not;
(ii) the defendant is subsequently discharged without violating his probation; and
(iii) the judge upon motion and notice to the prosecuting attorney, and a hearing if requested by either
party or the court, finds it is in the interest of justice
that the conviction be considered to be for a class A
misdemeanor.
(3) An offense may be reduced only one degree under this
section unless the prosecutor specifically agrees in writing or
on the court record that the offense may be reduced two
degrees. In no case may an offense be reduced under this
section by more than two degrees.
(4) This section may not be construed to preclude any
person from obtaining or being granted an expungement of his
record as provided by law.
isei
76-6-101. Definitions.
For purposes of this chapter
(1) "Property" means any form of real property or
tangible personal property which is capable of being
damaged or destroyed and includes a habitable structure.
(2) "Habitable structure" means any building, vehicle,
trailer, railway car, aircraft, or watercraft used for lodging
or assembling persons or conducting business whether a
person is actually present or not
(3) "Property* is that of another, if anyone other than
the actor has a possessory or proprietary interest in any
portion thereof.
(4) "Value" means:
(a) The market value of the property, if totally
destroyed, at the time and place of the offense, or
where cost of replacement exceeds the market value;
or
(b) Where the market value cannot be ascertained,
the cost of repairing or replacing the property within
a reasonable time following the offense.
(5) If the property damaged has a value that cannot be
ascertained by the criteria set forth in Subsections (a) and
(b) above, the property shall be deemed to have a value
less than $300.
iees
76-6-103. Aggravated arson.
(1) A person is guilty of aggravated arson if by means of fire
or explosives he intentionally and unlawfully damages:
(a) a habitable structure; or
(b) any structure or vehicle when any person not a
participant in the offense is in the structure or vehicle.
(2) Aggravated arson is a felony of the first degree.
i9SS
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77-1-3. Definitions.
For the purpose of this act:
(1) "Criminal action" means the proceedings by which a
person is charged, accused, and brought to trial for a
public offense.
(2) "Indictment" means an accusation in writing presented by a grand jury to the district court charging a
person with a public offense.
(3) "Information" means an accusation, in writing,
charging a person with a public offense which is presented, signed, and filed in the office of the clerk where the
prosecution is commenced pursuant to Section 77-2-1.1.
(4) "Magistrate" means a justice or judge of a court of
record or not of record or a commissioner of such a court
appointed in accordance with Section 78-3-31, except that
the authority of a court commissioner to act as a magistrate shall be limited by rule of the judicial council. The
judicial council rules shall not exceed constitutional limitations upon the delegation of judicial authority.
iws

77-23-201. Search warrant* - Definitions.
As used in this part:
(1) "Daytime" means the hours beginning at 6 a.m. and
ending at 10 p.m. local time.
(2) "Search warrant" is an order issued by a magistrate
in the name of the state and directed to a peace officer,
describing with particularity the thing, place, or person to
be searched and the property or evidence to be seized by
him and brought before the magistrate.
2001
78-5-101. Creation of justice court — Not of record.
Under Article VIII, Section 1, Utah Constitution, there is
created a court not of record known as the justice court. The
judges of this court are justice court judges.
iwt

78-5-106. Justice court judge authority.
Justice court judges:
(1) have the same authority regarding matters within
their jurisdiction as judges of courts of record;
(2) may issue search warrants and warrants of arrest
upon a finding of probable cause; and
(3) may conduct proceedings to determine:
(a) probable cause for any case within their jurisdiction; and
(b) an accused person's release on bail or his own
l989
recognizance.
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78-7-17.5. Authority of magistrate.
(1) Except as otherwise provided by law, a magistrate as
defined in Section 77-1-3 shall have the authority to:
(a) commit a person to incarceration prior to trial;
(b) set or deny bail under Section 77-20-1 and release
upon the payment of bail and satisfaction of any other
conditions of release;
(c) issue to any place in the state summonses and
warrants of search and arrest and authorize administrative traffic checkpoints under Section 77-23-104;
(d) conduct an initial appearance in a felony;
(e) conduct arraignments;
(f) conduct a preliminary examination to determine
probable cause;
(g) appoint attorneys and order recoupment of attorney
fees;
(h) order the preparation of presentence investigations
and reports;
(i) issue temporary orders as provided by rule of the
Judicial Council; and
(j) perform any other act or function authorized by
statute.
(2) A judge of the justice court may exercise the authority of
a magistrate specified in Subsection (1) with the following
limitations:
(a) a judge of the justice court may conduct an initial
appearance, preliminary examination, or arraignment in
a felony case as provided by rule of the Judicial Council;
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Addendum B
Photographs
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on t h e o ^ ^ day of December, 1999, I served a
true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER DENYING MOTION TO
SUPPRESS to each person listed below:
John E. Hummel
165 North 100 East #5
St. George, Utah 84770

(via first class mail)
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WILLARD R. BISHOP, P. C.
Willard R. Bishop - #0344
Attorney for Defendant
P.O. Box 279
Cedar City, UT 84721-0279
Telephone: (435) 586-9483

Clerk
SIXTH DISTRICT COURT

IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF KANE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
.

)

STATE OF UTAH,

•

)
)
)

Plaintiff,
•

:

•

'

)

VS.

'

"

•

'

)
"

DOROTHY DEE CARPENTER,
Defendant.
_

ORDER ON MOTION TO QUASH
SEARCH WARRANT AND SUPPRESS
EVIDENCE SEIZED

_

_

_

"

'

•

'

.

•

•

•

"

.

)

)
)
)
)

CaseNo.981600100FS
Honorable K.L. Mclff
•

The above entitled matter came on regularly for hearing before the Honorable K.L. Mclff,
District Judge, on Friday, 12 March 1999, pursuant to Defendant's "Motion to Quash Search
Warrant and Suppress Evidence Seized". Defendant Dorothy Dee Carpenter appeared
personally, and was represented by her attorney of record, Mr. Willard R. Bishop. Plaintiff State
of Utah appeared by and through its attorney of record, Mr. Colin R. Winchester, Kane County
Attorney. Witnesses were sworn and evidence was presented. Following the presentation of
evidence, argument was had. The Court being fully advised in the premises, and good cause
appearing,
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NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED as
follows:
1.

That Defendant's "Motion to Quash Search Warrant'', pertaining to that particular

search warrant issued on or about March 24, 1997, for the search of Defendant's residence and
place of business, should be and it hereby is, overruled and denied.
2.

That the following items of evidence shall not be permitted to be offered into

evidence by the State of Utah at the time of trial of this matter:
A.

One pair of Nike tennis shoes, located on the south, outside porch.

B.

One pair of Nike tennis shoes, located inside of south door.

C.

Coffee mug, located on kitchen counter.

D.

Yellow flashlight, located on kitchen counter.

E.

Cardboard sample, located in basement pantry.

F.

Red purse, located in southwest basement bedroom dresser.

G.

Two photographs, located on southwest bedroom dresser.

H.

Any and all evidence located or seized by the State of Utah in the absence

ofLynnBorg.
I.

That Plaintiff State of Utah shall not be permitted to offer into evidence,

notes ofLynnBorg.

2
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f.
DATED this l/J

day of

dj

_, 1999.
BY THE COURT:

K.L. McIFFnDistrict Judge
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

COLIN R. WINCHESTER
Attorney for Plaintiff

WILLARD R. BISHOP
Attorney for Defendant

3 J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Addendum D
Voir Dire Excerpts
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ArMpnrlum Fl

information from you.

My name is Kay Mclff.

judge of the sixth district court.

I serve as

The sixth district

court covers everything from the center part of the state
from the Utah County line on the north to the Arizona
border on the south.

I have the privilege to sit in six

different courthouses, Kane County, of course, on the
southern end.

My home is in Richfield.

lived there now for 32 years.
years.

My wife and I have

I practiced law there for 26

Since then I have been serving on the bench.

wife's name is Rene.

My

She was an educator during the early

part of our marriage, taught junior high school, then was a
full time mom for the balance of that time.
children.

We have five

Three of those children are married.

Two of

them remain unmarried and are at Utah State University.
Now, that gives you just a little glimpse into who
we are and what my wife has done and what I've done. And
we would like to find out that same information about each
of you.

And I'm going to start with you, Mr. Johnson.

Will you tell us about yourself and your wife, family and
employment education, those kinds of things.
MR. SCOTT JOHNSON:
work for Redhead's.

My name's Scott Johnson. I

I am a mechanic.

She works for the Kanab City.

My wife is Ralene.

And I have three children.

I have lived here for 53 years.
THE COURT: Does your wife work outside the home?
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MR. SCOTT JOHNSON:

She works for Kanab City,

yeah.
THE COURT:
MS.

Okay.

WENDY HARRIS:

THE COURT:

under.

It's L.

It's an "L" instead of a "C."

Thank you.

MS. WENDY HARRIS:
all my life.

Wendy C. Harris.

Beg your pardon?

MS. WENDY HARRIS:
THE COURT:

Thank you.

I'll make that correction.

I'm from this area.

Lived here

I am married, have four children nine and

I am a homemaker.

I do have a bachelor's degree in

elementary education in resource.
THE COURT:

Your husband?

MR. BLANE HARRIS:
THE COURT:

What's his name?

MR. BLANE HARRIS:
THE COURT:

He works for the county.

Burt Harris.

What kind of work does he do for the

county?
MR. BLANE HARRIS:

On the road department.

THE COURT:

Rhonda E. Flatberg.

Okay.

MS. FLATBERG:

Hi.

have lived in California.
six and-a-half years.

I live in Orderville now.

I

I have been in Orderville for

I am not working right now.

I

worked as a medical assistant and EMT and various other
things.

My husband, John, is a consultant for airlines.

He travels internationally quite a bit.

I have one son and
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three grandchildren.

And they live in Kanab.

It's right

here.
THE COURT:

Thank you, very much.

Michael W.

Evangelista.
MR. EVANGELISTA:
know how random this is.
two years now.
few.

Yes.

I'm the one son.

I don't

I have been in Kanab, let's see,

Before that I lived in Orderville for a

And I'm sole, full time employee of the local

newspaper here in Kanab.

I'm also the single father of

three children and a bunch of other things.

But that's

probably all that's relevant.
THE COURT: When you say sole employee, do they
have other, anyone else?
MR. EVANGELISTA:
sometimes.

There is one other lady

I am the main editorial assistant and do

everything that's required to do with the newspaper.
THE COURT: All right.

Thank you.

Blane T.

Harris.
MR. BLANE HARRIS:
all my life.
ago.

Resident of Glendale for about

I just returned from a mission about a year

And I am currently employed with South-Central

Communications Telephone.
THE COURT:

Okay.

•MR. BLANE HARRIS:

THE COURT:

Single?
Yes.

Thank you.

Kevin D. Tullis.
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MR. HEATON: Twelve to six.
THE COURT: Okay.
in the home?

And your wife works?

She works

She's a homemaker?

MR. HEATON: Pretty much homemaker, yeah.
THE COURT: Shirl W. Spencer.
MR. SPENCER: I live in Glendale.
this area most of my life.
children, 13 grandchildren.
at Valley High School.

I have lived in

I am married, have eight
Currently, I am the principal

My wife manages a convenience store

in Mount Carmel Junction.
THE COURT: Okay.

Minor children at home?

MR. SPENCER: I have an 18 year old at home.
THE COURT: All right.

Thank you.

Curtis J.

Burgoyne.
MR. BURGOYNE: I am Curtis.
Pattern and Tooling.
kids.

I work at Smith

I am married to Wendy.

We have three

I grew up in California and pretty much moved out

here after I graduated from high school.
THE COURT: Okay.

Thank you.

MR. JUSTIN JONES:

I live in Kanab.

ranch about 60 miles outside of Kanab.
dad.

Justin R. Jones.
I live on a

I run it for my

I am married to Joanie, my wife. And we got a 20

month old little girl.

And she works at the ranch with me.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Arlene W. Goulding?

MS. GOULDING: I have been married to Clyde for 53
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He was in construction.

Grading and paving.

THE COURT: Okay.

Eric C. Brown.

MR. BROWN: E. Brown.
THE COURT: What is it?

Eric E.?

Thank you.

MR. BROWN: I was born here in Kanab.

I_wenfc,,to

school in Ogden for five years, came back here aTicr started
a welding shop.
two weeks ago.

Did that for seven years.

Closed it down

Just started working for Waterman Welding.

THE COURT:

Wife?

MR.

Single.

BROWN:

THE COURT: And Rinda Alldredge.
MS. ALLDREDGE: Lived in Kanab most of my life. I
was raised in Orderville.

I am married to Hallen.

the Junction Drive-in here in Kanab.

We run

I graduated from

college SUU with a degree in communications.

And my

husband is also the fire chief here in town. And I am
bookkeeper for my parents' business also.
THE COURT: All right.

Thank you.

I'm going to

ask you now some questions about relationships.

And I'm

going to just kind of go down the line and see if you have
any of these relationships.

Please tell me. And I am

concerned about relationships with any of the parties or
the lawyers or the witnesses who will be called.

I am

going to allow the lawyers now to introduce themselves and
tell us who their witnesses will be.

I'll also allow the
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defense counsel to introduce his clients.

Mr. Winchester.

MR. WINCHESTER: Thank you, Your Honor.
is Colin Winchester.

My name

I have lived here in Kanab for about

five and-a-half years.

I'm married to Rebecca Winchester.

She's a teacher's aid at the Kanab Elementary School. We
have five children at home.

Oldest onefs in high school.

Youngest is somewhere in elementary school.
track.

I don't keep

He's this big.
Will be at times assisted by Chris Rasmussen who

works in my office.

Chris and his wife have lived here for

about a year now, two years --'
MR. RASMUSSEN: Year and-a-half,,
MR. WINCHESTER: -- and they have three children.
One of them is brand spanking new.
We have a long list of witnesses.

I'll try to

tell you their names and perhaps where they are from,
Michael Royce is from Salt Lake City; Bruce Tobler, St.
George; Lynn Borg, Salt Lake City; Jennifer McNair, Salt
Lake City; Dennis Fleming, St. George; Sheldon Sorensen,
here in Kanab.

He works for the special service district.

I think his wife is in the jury panel.

Jamie Mackelprang.

She's married to the Kanab City attorney.
Mackelprang, she lives here in Kanab.

Miss

Laurie Stewart in

Kanab; Oran Peck, from St. George; Joe Johnson, Kanab.
Then there are several fire fighters.
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We won't be
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calling all of these fire fighters, but we may call several
of them.

Stan White, Aaron Wilson, Tracy Cutler, Dilworth

Perkins, Nate White, Keith Robinson and, of course, Alan
Alldredge, the fire chief; former Kanab City police officer
by the name of Bret Smith who now lives in Phoenix, Dave
Winkleman.

They are from Kanab.

I believe his family

still lives here. And I think he's working in St. George.
Seated behind me is Tom Cram with the city police
department.

Kelly Fischer from Colorado City; perhaps Jeff

Mosdell, another fire fighter; perhaps Michael Leighton,
former resident of Kanab; Jim Hooper, I think out of St.
George; Chase Van Slooten, a young man who lives here in
Kanab; Cindy Montgomery, who lives here in Kanab; Don Ross,
I believe Sedona, Arizona, or Oak Creek Village, Arizona.
Or we may call a fellow by the name of Herb, and I
apologize I don't know Herb's last name, but one of the two
will be here.
THE COURT: They are from Page?
MR. WINCHESTER: No, from the Sedona area.
THE COURT:

Sedona.

MR. WINCHESTER: Um-hmm.
Arizona.

Denise Rosales, Cameron,

Then Dan Watson, who is now with the Fredonia

Marshal, but still lives here in Kanab.
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Hummel.
MR. HUMMEL: My name is John Hummel.
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I am

originally from Richfield, Utah.
there.

Went to school there.

I married way over my head.

Grew up there.

Born

I married a Richfield girl.

And my duty in life is to try

to keep up with her.

And we have five children.

them are youngsters.

We are coping with our first teenager

right now.

All of

He's 13. That, for my hairline.

I am a resident of St. George right now.
Although, I have been coming to Kanab area since about 1990
quite regularly.

So some of your faces are quite familiar.

I am the defense attorney in this case. And,
obviously, I represent the two defendants in this matter.
Let me tell you about them.

The first is Robert Beltran.

Hefs originally from Prescott, Arizona.
construction arena.

He was in the

He did construction, was a heavy

equipment mechanic for about 3 5 years.

He had an

industrial accident in 1983 and also fell off of a piece of
equipment and fell 32 feet and injured his back.
disabled.

He was

Attempted --he moved to Arizona to open a

mechanic shop there, and auto repair service area there, a
garage with seven bays, an ambitious project.

He closed

that down based on doctor's orders and came to Kanab to
assist Dee Carpenter, his friend, in running a restaurant
here in town.
Dee is originally from Scottsdale, Arizona.

After

graduating from high school, she married her sweet heart
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and spent a lot of years involved in military lifestyle.
Her husband was sent to •-- I can't say the name.
DEFENDANT CARPENTER:
MR. HUMMEL: Okay.
air force fighter pilot.
Maryland.

Enskooky (phonetic).

Air force fighter in Japan, as

She went to the University of

And she managed in, or majored in restaurant/

hotel management.

She came back to Williams Field Air

Force Base in Chandler, Arizona.

And her husband,

unfortunately, at that point, was sent to Viet Nam in '68
to 1970. After -- in 1971 he contracted a brain stem
encephalitis as a result of insect bite and passed away.
She's a widow.
She worked for Del Webb Corporation and had
managed a private club for several years.

She then got

into the food and beverage business, and was in that for 2 9
years.

She has owned and operated the Frontier Barbecue &

Steak House here in Kanab.

That's south of town on the

way, basically, across the street from the Rancho's
turnout -- turn-in there or turnout, I guess, depending on
which way you are going.

And she leased the property there

for a while, later owned the property and managed the
property.

She is one of the defendants in this case.

Our witnesses are, may potentially include the
following:

Joe Johnson, Don Cox, Sandy Banks, Janna Aston,

Mack Williams, Joan Matson, George Kelly, Mark Riddle, Ron
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Glover, Taylor Buttons, Pete Martin, Gordon Bishop, and
also some people who are not from this area.
them has some ties to the area.
Carpenter.

John Blundell, and Ray

He's no relation to Dee Carpenter.

master electrician from St. George.
C-r-o-p-f.

Well, one of

He is a

And Jim Cropf.

Those are the folks we anticipate having as

witnesses, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Hummel.

All right.

I'm going to ask you now about relationships with anyone
who has been identified either as a party, either of the
defendants, either of the lawyers, or any one who has been
named as a potential witness.

Keep that group in mind.

And I'll ask you first, is there anyone of you who is
related to any of those persons as close as a first cousin?
All right.

Let me start up here and on the back row.

Any --as close as a first cousin to anyone who's been
identified.
JUROR:

Personal?

THE COURT: Okay.

Let me get to the back row.

Mrs. Burgoyne.
MS. BURGOYNE: John is my brother-in-law,
THE COURT: Tell me exactly how that relationship
arises.

.
MS. BURGOYNE: His --my husband -- Curtis's

sister is married to John.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

THE COURT: The statute is pretty specific about
the blood relationships. And so I'm going to have to
excuse Wendy Burgoyne and Curtis Burgoyne and Kent Anderson
and A. Lynn Button, Amy L. Sorensen, Raleigh Franklin and
Mrs. Alldredge.

I thank each one of you for your

attendance here today.

I am confident that you would be

very good jurors, but I'm not able to use you.
JUROR:

Judge, Jamie White is my wife's aunt.

THE COURT: All right.
JUROR:

I'll get --

Does that matter?

THE COURT:
JUROR:

Thank you.

No.

T h a t ' s not

--

That's a try.

THE COURT: Okay.

Thank you.

I'll get some more

general relationships in just a moment.

Okay.

We have

dealt with the blood relationships.

Now, I'm obliged to

deal with some other relationships.

Listen carefully.

Do

any of you have, with any of these persons that have been
named, a debtor/creditor relationship?
or they owe you money?

You owe them money

Court hears none.

Guardian/ward relationship?
Master/servant relationship?
long this law has been around.

Court hears none.
Which tells you how

Court hears none.

Employer -JUROR:

Excuse me.

Explain that a little.

work for one of those people that's been named?
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Do I

THE COURT:

or employee.
right.

Well, that's the next one.

Employer or employee relationship.

Mr. Hunter.

Employer
All

Tell me.

MR. HUNTER: Ron Glover is one of the witnesses

called.
THE COURT: Was he named, Mr. Winchester?
MR.

WINCHESTER: Not on my list.

Is that on your list?
MR. HUMMEL:

Yes.

THE COURT: Okay.
MR.

HUNTER:

Ron Glover.

Um-hmm.

THE COURT: And tell me what your relationship is.
MR.

HUNTER: I work on the off-year -- when it's

cold, I work at the lumber yard.
directions.

And I go by his

I work for him.

THE COURT: So I see you are not working with him

now, but you did some in the wintertime?
MR. HUNTER:

Yes.

THE COURT: Does he own the lumber yard?

j

MR.
;•

'.-.••'

THE

HUNTER:

No.

COURT: But he has some kind of supervisory

role there?
MR.

HUNTER:

Yes.

THE COURT: Let me tell you what your

responsibilil:y, each one of you, would be.

Each one of you
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who serves would have the responsibility to listen
carefully to the evidence and base your verdict solely on
the evidence, not influenced by relationships.

You would

have to approach your assignment honestly and with
integrity.

And if a relationship would compromise your

integrity in some way, then that would be of some concern
to me.

If you were -- you explained this relationship

which is not a true employer/employee situation, off-season
you have, you work for the same owner, I guess, and have
some relationship.

If you were a juror, could you base

your verdict in this case solely on the evidence in court
uninfluenced by that relationship?
MR. HUNTER: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Thank you.
this other row.
front?

Now, let me just go down

Employer/employee relationships on the

No. And to you, Ms. McAllister?
MS. MCALLISTER:

Yes.

I was kind of temporarily

hired as they were opening up of the restaurant.
some sewing for her.

I did

I do --

THE COURT: How long ago has that been?
MS. MCALLISTER:
they first opened.

Three years ago, maybe. Whenever

About three years ago.

THE COURT: All right. And how long of time did
you work?
MS. MCALLISTER:

Oh, just three weeks at the most,

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

somewhere in there.

I made some aprons for them before

they opened up the business.
THE COURT: After that three weeks or so, did you
maintain any further employer/employee relationship?
MS. MCALLISTER:

No.

THE COURT: Did you maintain a close personal
relationship?
MS. MCALLISTER:

No.

THE COURT: No.

Was there anything about that

experience there that would cause you to be for or against
either side in this case?

That's just a yes or no.

Anything that would cause you to be for or against?
-

MS.

MCALLISTER:

Yes.

THE COURT: All right.

Now, I'm going to --

that's the kind of question, then, that I'm going to deal
with in chambers private.

And if there are any other

answers that would be inappropriate to disclose to
everyone, I'm going to give you a chance to visit with me
privately.

So I'm going to pass on that for right now and

just make a note.
Now, let me go on down.
relationship on the front row.

Next employer/employee

Next row.

down, then, to you, Mr. Trudell.

No.

Okay.

I'm

Who is your relationship

with?
MR. TRUDELL: Well, I would ask you a question, if
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or they owe him anything?
MS.

WALKER:

No.

THE COURT: They do not?
MS.

WALKER:

No.

THE COURT: Were you personally involved with
them?
MS.

WALKER:

No,

THE COURT: Is there anything about that
relationship or the fact that he did work there, anything
about that that would cause you to be biased for or against
either side in this case?
MS. WALKER:

Yeah, maybe.

THE COURT: All right.

I'll visit with you.

Thank you. Anyone else employer/employee?

Court hears

none.
Next one. Any one of you a partner with any of
these persons that have been identified?

Court hears none.

Any one of you a joint obligor with any of those
persons, that is, together you owe somebody something?
Court hears none.
Does any one of you have an attorney/client
relationship with either of the attorneys in this case?
JUROR:

Go to church with them.

THE COURT: Beg your pardon?
JUROR: Go to church with them.
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THE COURT: No.

Attorney/client relationship.

Court hears none.
Any one of you have a landlord/tenant
relationship?

Court hears none.

All right.
classifications.

I'm going to ask about those broader

I'm going to ask you about general

acquaintances with the parties, the lawyers, any of the
witnesses.

But I'm going to preface it first with an

example or two.

We live in a -- we live in a fairly

sparsely populated area.

It is not uncommon for persons to

know almost everyone else in town, and even in the county
for that matter.

Your acquaintances would likely carry

over to Glendale and Orderville and maybe on out to Big
Water or Church Wells.

So I am aware of that.

I live in Richfield, a little larger, but, still,
I know most people in town.
general acquaintanceships.

I'm not concerned about
I live across the street from

Jim Forsey, who is family, made Forsey Ice Cream for many
years.

And he and I play golf together on occasion. And

we fish together on occasion.

And we are close,

sufficiently close that it would not be appropriate for me
to participate on a jury in which he was a witness or had
something at stake.

So now I'm going to have to ask each

one of you to think about all these persons and see if we
can sort out relationships that could compromise personal
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integrity or fairness.

I ask you to carefully think about

it, not as a way of being excused, but as way of honest
appraisal of the circumstance.
Now, going to start back through the list. Any
one of you who has such a close relationship with someone
who's been identified that it would, you would feel like it
would preclude you from listening from the evidence and
deciding the case honestly and fairly?

Anyone?

with Mr. Johnson and going down the back row.
relationship there?

Starting

Any

Mr. Evangelista.

MR. EVANGELISTA:

I don't know if it's a close

relationship, but I feel probably working at the newspaper
I do see Mr. Winchester every couple days.

He hasn't

spoken a word to me, of course, about this case.

But I

have heard from many other people about this case, and I
feel that I might bring that up.
THE COURT: I'm going to be talking about exposure
to the case further along.

But I'm now concerned about,

just about whether you see him every day, I don't care as
long as you can make independent judgments.
MR.

EVANGELISTA:

Sure.

THE COURT: Could you do that?
MR. EVANGELISTA:

Sure.

THE COURT: Thank you. Anyone else on the back
row?

This front row, any other relationships that would
72
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THE COURT: All right.
chambers.

Okay.

relationship?

I'll consider that then in

Now, anyone else have a close

Mr. Aiken.

MR. AIKEN:

Yes. Keith Robinson and I are good

fishing friends, hiking and camping.
THE COURT: Would he be one of many or kind of a
singular friend?
MR. AIKEN:

Excuse me?

THE COURT: Would he be one of many friends or
would he be extra special?
MR. AIKEN:

He's extra special.

THE COURT: All right.
that one. All right.

Well, I kind of asked for

Now, I'm down to you, Mr. Brown?

MR. BROWN: Well, I know a number of them, but Joe
Johnson as well as Pete Martin. As a bouncer of the bar, I
have talked with them quite a bit.

Pete's been a friend

for a long time, helped him out of a lot of bad situations.
THE COURT: And he's one of the witnesses?
MR, BROWN: Um-hmm.
,.'%';:'•' THE COURT: Well, I'll visit with you and you can
tell me about it.
Anyone else?

I'll visit with you privately.

Okay.

Court hears none.

Now, I'm going to ask about relationships with law
enforcement.

Is there any one of you who has -- this does

not necessarily disqualify you, I just want to know about
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these relationships -- any one of you have a close family
member who is involved as a full time law enforcement
officer?

All right.

Let's talk about -- Miss Harris, you

have someone.
MS. WENDY HARRIS:

I have.

My younger brother is

employed with Kanab City Police department.

And my

brother-in-law is employed with Kanab Police full time.
THE COURT: Two.
MS. WENDY HARRIS:

Your younger brother?
Yes.

THE COURT: And brother-in-law?
MS. WENDY HARRIS:

Kane County.

THE COURT: Okay.

As we visit about these

relationships, let me just tell you that you are going to
hear testimony from law enforcement personnel.

And you are

going to hear testimony from persons of other professions.
I don't know what all the professions will be, whether they
will be ranchers or plumbers or rock shop operators or
school teachers.

Whoever it is, it would be your

responsibility to listen carefully to the testimony and to
give every witness, witness' testimony fair consideration
without regard t.o that person's profession.

So the

question that I will put to you is, would you give undue
weight to the testimony of a law enforcement officer versus
the testimony of a school teacher or someone from some
other profession?
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MS. WENDY HARRIS:

I think they are all equal.

THE COURT: And you feel in your mind you could
treat them all -'MS.

WENDY HARRIS:

Yes, sir.

THE COURT: All right.

Thank you. Now,

Miss Flatberg, did you have someone -MS.

FLATBERG:

No.

THE COURT: -- close association with law
enforcement officers?
MR. BLANE HARRIS:

Yes. My brother works for the

county as an officer.
THE COURT: And that's your brother?
MR. BLANE HARRIS:

Yes.

MR. HUMMEL: Your Honor, on these where we are
getting some identification of some family relationship,
perhaps I'll ask the court, would it be appropriate to find
out who they are so we'll know?
THE COURT: Sure-

Tell us who --

MR. HUMMEL: We would have to backtrack on the
•

•

•

•

'

last one, I'm afraid.
THE COURT: All right.

Let's go back. And,

Ms. Harris, you tell us who your brother is.
MS. WENDY HARRIS:
William Crosby.

My brother is Billy Crosby --

And brother-in-law is Brian Harris.

THE COURT: Crosby and Harris?
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MS.

WENDY HARRIS:

THE COURT:

Yes.

Either of those have any involvement

in this case, Mr. Winchester, that you are aware of?
MR.

WINCHESTER: Not to my knowledge.

THE COURT:
MR.

Now, your brother, Mr. Harris.

BLANE HARRIS:

Brian Harris.

That's my

sister-.in-law.
THE COURT:

Okay.

So you are brother and

sister- in-law?
MR.

BLANE HARRIS:

THE COURT:

Mr. Harris.

Yes, she s my sister-in-law.

I have a couple of questions for you.

First, could you give the testimony of each

I witness fair cons iderat ion, or would you be inclined to
give greater weight to the testimony of a police officer?
MR.

BLANE HARRIS:

THE COURT:

It would be equal.

Think you could treat them fairly

either i
^ay?
MR. BLANE HARRIS:
i1

sister

THE COURT:

Yes.

Now, i f you were on a jury with your

--

MR. BLANE HARRIS:
THE COURT:

In-law.

— would you be able to exercise •*.

totally independent judgment, uninfluenced, or not
influenced, by the fact that one other juror was your
sister; could you do that?
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MR.

BLANE HARRIS:

Yeah.

THE COURT: What if you disagreed with each other?
MR. BLANE HARRIS:

Have a brawl.

THE COURT: Do you feel like you could be wholly
independent in your judgment?
MR. BLANE HARRIS:

Yes.

THE COURT: And, Miss Harris, could you be
independent in your judgment?
MS.

WENDY HARRIS:

Yes, sir.

THE COURT: All right.

Thank you.

Now, I'm

talking about relationship with a police officer.
else on this front?
MS. TULLIS:

All right.

Anyone

Mr. Tullis?

My first cousin, Erik Cullen, is

working with the sherifffs department and city police.
THE COURT: First cousin, Cullen.

Does he have

any involvement in this case that you are aware of?
MR. WINCHESTER: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Could you give each, the testimony of
each witness fair consideration, not giving undue weight to
the testimony of an officer?
MS. TULLIS:

It would be equal.

THE COURT: All right.
this front row now?
Miss McAllister.

Thank you.

Anyone else on

Now, I'm down to your row,

Any relationships along that row?

relationships with police officers, family?

Close

Hearing none.
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MR. KEGEL: Yes.
THE COURT: And by your son's training?
MR. KEGEL:

(Juror nodded head affirmatively.)

THE COURT: Thank you.

Anyone else?

I'm going to visit with you anyway.
Remind me to talk about it. Okay.

Mr. Linton,

We can talk about it.
Anyone else?

Relationship with a law enforcement officer.

Court hears

none.
For the record, the charges in this case are
charges of arson.

Is there any one of you who has had any

involvement either as a victim or an investigator or had a.
close association with someone who's been a victim in an
arson case?

Anyone?

Court hears none.

Any one of you who has been charged or accused in
a case relating to arson?

And I'll allow you to visit with

me privately if there is something we should visit about.
Court hears none.
This case has been the subject of newspaper
articles and perhaps media coverage beyond the newspaper.
I'm going to ask you now what exposure you have had to this
case.

If your only exposure is through the media,

newspapers or otherwise, tell me.

If it's some other kind

of exposure, then I may want to visit with you privately
about that.

So let me find out who's heard about the case.

Starting on the back row, any prior knowledge of this case,
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media, common rumor, gossip, or otherwise?
this back row?

Okay

Anyone along

First, Miss Flatberg, the source of

information from your standpoint?
MS.

FLATBERG: Media and common gossip.

THE COURT:

Media and gossip.

Okay.

Was the

gossip any different than what was reported in the media?
MS.

FLATBERG: Probably a little.

THE COURT:
MS.

FLATBERG:

THE COURT:

right.

Did it go beyond?
Yeah.

I don't want you to tell me what. All

I'll visit with you.

All right.

Now, the / I'm

going 1to visit with you, Mr. Newspaperman.
Okay.

Others on the back row.
MR. BLANE HARRIS:
THE COURT;

Wefll find out.

Okay.

Common gossip.

Newspaper articles, have you seen any

of those or just -MR. BLANE HARRIS:

Just a little bit. I remember

seeing it in the paper, but I don't know who they are.
THE COURT:

All right.

We'll visit.

Yes '

Mr. Hunter?
MR. HUNTER:

Newspaper articles and small town

talk.
THE COURT:

Let me tell you about both of those.

I'll tell you about 1both of them.

With all due re spect to

our newspaper representative, not everything that appears
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in the newspaper is wholly accurate.
in our society, in our culture.

Very valuable service

But, in this trial, you

are going to hear from the people who were there, the
people who participated in the investigation.

You are

going to get direct information from the very best sources
that can be brought to bare.

If you were to serve on this

jury, it would be your responsibility to set aside what you
may have heard in common gossip or what you may have read
in the newspaper or heard on radio or television.
would have to be able to do that.

You

So I'm going to be

asking you if you can, in fact, do that.
All right.
Mr. Hunter.

Now, wait.

You say you have heard some common --

MR. HUNTER:

Yes.

THE COURT: All right.
you.

I'll get back down here to

Front row?

I'll visit briefly with

Anyone here heard any media information

or stories about it?
MS. GOULDING: I have a son and daughter and
son-in-law that lives here that sold me a lot, and he's a
friend of Colin1s.
THE COURT: Okay.
Miss Goulding.

I'll visit with you,

Miss Jacob.

MS. JACOBS:
THE WITNESS:

MS. JACOBS:

Just what was in the paper.
You read?

Yes.

I'm out of the loop.

I'm out
84
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of the gossip.
THE COURT: So we know what you have seen,
whatever was in the newspaper?
MS. JACOBS:

Just in the local paper.

And that

was quite a while ago. And I have forgotten most of it.
THE COURT: All right.

Let me ask you, if you

were selected as a juror, could you set aside anything that
you may have read in the newspaper and base your verdict
solely on what you hear in open court?
MS. JACOBS:

I would take it on what the witnesses

said and judge it objectively.
THE COURT: And you could do that?
MS. JACOBS:

Oh, yes.

THE COURT: Thank you.
MR. THEBEAU: Yes.

Yes.

Mr. Thebeau.

I deal quite a bit with Stan

White, the building inspector.

And we have discussed

things that occurred during that time.
THE COURT: All right.

Well, I think I need to

visit with you.
•MR. JUSTIN JONES:

Just what I have read in the

newspaper.
THE COURT: Have you had conversations with others
or just read it in the newspaper?
MR. JUSTIN JONES:

Just gossip.

THE COURT: Let me come down to you, now.
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JUROR:

I know two of the witnesses.

I spoke to

them about it.
THE COURT: All right.

I'll visit with you.

Anyone else along this front row that's had any exposure to
this case?

Court hears none.

Anyone along that?

Okay.

I'm to you, Mr. Adair.

I'm to you, Mr. Anderson.

MR. JAMES ANDERSON: Media, newspaper.

And also

some of the witnesses have talked to me about that.
THE COURT: All right.
back to second row.

Milligan.

I'll visit with you. Now,
Anyone along there?

I am

going to be visiting already with Mr. Taylor,
Ms. Chamberlain.
MR. KEGEL;

I just read the newspaper.

THE COURT:

That's your only source is the

newspaper?
MR. KEGEL;

Yes.

THE COURT: You have not discussed the case with
other people?
MR. KEGEL:

No.

THE COURT: So we know what you know.

Now, let me

ask you, if you were a juror, can you set aside and base
your verdict solely on the evidence that comes forth in
court?
MR. KEGEL: Yes.
THE COURT: Thank you. Anyone else there? All
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would cause you to be unable to serve in this case fairly?
MR. REED: No.
THE COURT: Thank you. Anyone else along the back
row?

All right.

Court hears -- oh, thank you.

Let's see,

Miss Wetzel.
MS. WETZEL: I was on a case for six months in
criminal charges.

Five defendants guilty.

THE COURT: Where was that.
MS.' WETZEL: San Diego. All guilty but one.
THE COURT: Well, that was very extensive
experience.

Anything about that experience that would

cause you to question your ability to be fair and objective
in this case?
MS.

WETZEL:

No.

THE COURT: Thank you. Anyone else?
none.

Court hears

Is there anything that I have not. touched on best

known to yourself that would cause you to question your
ability to be fair to both sides and to base your verdict
solely on the evidence?

If there is something that we

should visit about, we can either do it here or I'll do it
in chambers. Anything that would cause you to question
your ability to be fair?

Anyone?

Court hears none.

Mr. Winchester, are there\ other questions that I
should pose here or in chambers?

Any questions here that I

should deal with?
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MR. WINCHESTER: I have one, Your Honor.

You have

asked about relationships with law enforcement officers.
Because of the nature of this case, I think it would be
appropriate to ask about relationships with fire fighters.
THE COURT: All right.

That's a fair question.

Relationships with fire fighters. Anyone along the back
row?

In the box.

Court hears none.

Well, okay.

Miss Harris.
MS. WENDY HARRIS:

My brother-in-law is a

volunteer fireman.
THE COURT: Your brother-in-law is a volunteer
fireman in Kanab?
MS. WENDY HARRIS:

No.

Orderville.

THE COURT: Did he have any involvement in this
case that you are aware of?
MS. WENDY HARRIS:

THE COURT: No?

No.

Would the fact that he's a

volunteer fireman in Orderville have any impact on your
ability to hear the evidence here and to judge this case
fairly?
MS. WENDY HARRIS:

No.

THE COURT: You are confident you could hear the
evidence and base your verdict solely on the evidence?
MS. WENDY HARRIS:

Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Anyone else on the back
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row?
none.

Court hears none.
All right.

Front row in the box.

Court hears

Back on the first row in the audience.

Does anyone there have a relationship with a volunteer
fireman or a fire fighter or a full time fire fighter any
place?

Court hears none. All right.

Mr. Anderson.

MR. JAMES ANDERSON: I have been on the department
for 14 years.
THE COURT: Yeah.

And you have explained that.

And you have trained most of these officers.
All right. Anyone else?

Next row.

I remember.

Anyone have any

relationship with a fire fighter, volunteer or full time?
Mr. Linton, I'm going to visit with you. Okay.
Anyone else?
All right.

Ifm going to be visiting with you,

Mr. Trudell.
And, Mr. Brown, visiting with you.
Mr. Aiken, I'm visiting with you. Anyone else?
Make sure that you visit about that when I visit with you.
Okay.

Any other questions?
MR. WINCHESTER: None here.

Thank you.

THE COURT: Mr. Hummel?

MR. HUMMEL: Your Honor, I think I have some notes
about this, but I better make sure.

I am wondering if

there are any family relationships with other people who
are prospective jurors.
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THE COURT: Well, we know this one, the Harris
relationship.
MR. HUMMEL: I know of that one.
THE COURT: That's a fair question.

Are there

other -MR. HUMMEL: I think three and four are.
MR. EVANGELISTA:

Yeah.

THE COURT: All right.

Mother and son.
Mother and son.

MR. BLANE HARRIS:

My wife's over there.

THE COURT: Okay.

Let's start right with you,

Miss Flatberg.
MS. FLATBERG: I am Mike Evangelista's mother.
THE COURT: Would there be any concern on your
part to want to agree with your son if you didn't see the
evidence the same way that he saw it?
MS.

FLATBERG:

Not really.

THE COURT: Do you think you could make an
independent decision?
MS.

FLATBERG:

Yes.

THE COURT: And what if it's different than his
dicision?
MS. FLATBERG: He'll live with it.
THE COURT: All right.
MR. EVANGELISTA:

Mr. Evangelista.

You did it.

I'm proud of you.

THE COURT: Suppose you disagreed with your
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own judgment, by I do have trouble with his.
THE COURT:

Well --

MR. HUMMEL: Your Honor, his judgment must be good
because he married her.
THE COURT: You have to assure me both ways.

You

have to assure me that you wouldn't go against him just
because he's your husband, or you wouldn't agree with him
because he's your husband.

Can you exercise independent

judgment?
MRS. AUDREY TULLIS:

Yes.

THE COURT: All right.

Other relationships as

close as first cousin?
MR. WINCHESTER: Your Honor, you have one here on
the front row, unless I missed it.
MS. GOULDING: Son-in-law right back there.
THE COURT: Who is your son-in-law?
MS. GOULDING:

Louis Pratt.

THE COURT: All right.
with Mr. Pratt.

I'm going to be visiting

Suppose you disagree with him?

MS. GOULDING: Of course.

All the time.

THE COURT: Are you confident you could be
independent in your judgment?
MS. GOULDING: Probably not, no.
THE COURT: All right.
else?

Thank you. Now, anyone

Mr. Hummel, any other questions I should put to the
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whole group?
MR. HUMMEL: Actually, I have one potential one.
Perhaps we should approach.
THE COURT:

All right.

(Whereupon, a sidebar conference
was held off the record.)
THE COURT: Is there any one of you who is aware
of either of these attorneys representing someone or being
involved in a case where you had something at stake or
where someone else did, and you came out of that case with
some feelings antagonistic to either of these attorneys
that would potentially carry over here?
such a relationship?

Any one aware of

All right.

Miss Goulding, you shook your head.
to -- I'll visit with you.

I'll note that.

I'm going
Anyone else

that's had some association with a case where one of these
lawyers were involved but because of that you hold some ill
feelings?

All right.

Anyone else?

Miss Guevarra, I'll visit with you.

Now, Mr. Hummel, do I need to be more

specific than that?
MR.

HUMMEL:

I --

THE COURT: Mr. Winchester, do I need to be more
specific?
MR. HUMMEL: I told the court my concerns.
THE COURT: Well, I don't have any problem about
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being more specific.
MR. WINCHESTER: Your Honor, I was aware of one
potential issue, but that juror has already been excused so
I don't need to explore it any further.
THE COURT: Mr. Hummel disclosed that he
represented, for some years represented the Division of
Child and Family Services and worked on their cases. Is
there any one of you who's had a case involving the
Division of Child and Family Services where you had contact
with -- cause an adverse or bias towards --•. '
MR. HUMMEL: Your Honor, perhaps even since I was
an assistant Attorney General, perhaps they may have some
involvement with the Attorney General's Office.
THE COURT: He was the Deputy Attorney General at
the time. Anyone who had involvement with the Attorney
General's Office in any way that would carry over to
Mr. Hummel?

In the course of our lives, we wear many hats.

You do not have that relationship now?
MR. HUMMEL:

No.

THE COURT: But you are concerned about any
carry-over from a prior case?
MR. HUMMEL: That's right.
THE COURT: Anyone have any concern arising out of
a prior case or any bias or sympathy for or against either
side?

Court hears none. Anyone else?

Anything else,
100
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MR. WINCHESTER:

Um-hmm.

THE COURT: All right.

We'll talk to him. And

Harris, Blane Harris. He and his sister, I haven't heard
anything from either one of them that suggests --I'll
visit with her.
MR. HUMMEL: My concern is, again, we have
relatives there. Most often the way they resolve -- I
mean, I have seen other cases resolved.

They take the

lowest number and take the other member off of it, if it's
just a relative issue.
THE COURT: I don't think they are automatically
disqualified.

I inquired pretty carefully about it.

I'll

interview -- I'm going to be interviewing him anyway.
Number 13 was Goulding.
MR. HUMMEL: We skipped number six.

Darren

Coleman is his first cousin. Tullis.
THE COURT: Okay.

Let's see.

Did I already --

MR. WINCHESTER: My notes say you were going to
talk with him, but I don't remember why.

Okay.

Marc

Hunter, you were going to.
THE COURT: Wait a minute.
MR. HUMMEL: I'm not saying I have any specific -THE COURT: Six, I was going to -- I don't have
any specific problem identifying.

I thought you wanted to

go through all the ones that you were going to talk with.
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MR. WINCHESTER: Sorry about that.
THE COURT: Sit down, if you will, Mr. Harris.
You indicated you had had some -- you had a possible
relationship, then also you heard about the case.

Tell us

about the relationship first.
MR. BLANE HARRIS:

About my brother being on the

police force?
THE COURT:

Yes.

MR. BLANE HARRIS:

He's actually a jailer here.

THE COURT: We talked about that at some length.
You indicated that would not compromise your ability to
judge the case.

Do you feel that way?

MR. BLAME HARRIS:

Um-hmm.

THE COURT: You are sure you can be fair?
MR. BLANE HARRIS:

Yes.

MR. HUMMEL: Was that the source of some
information on the case?
MR. BLANE HARRIS:
long ago the fire happened.

No.

He -- I don't know how

But he hasn't been -- well, I

was on my mission when he got the job there. And just
recently he is going to have a promotion.

He's going to be

patrolling.
THE COURT: What else did you hear about the case
that you could tell us?
MR. BLAME HARRIS:

Basically, the town stuff.
117
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THE COURT:

Like what?

MR. BLANE HARRIS:

I don't know in specific.

Just

how this was a fire there and some people suspected that it
was caused by someone.

You know, I don't really know the

people here in Kanab that well, so I don't really know. I
wouldn't be able to say a name if they even told me. I
really don't know.
THE COURT: The folks that were charged have pled
not guilty.

They are entitled to be, and the law presumes,

that they are innocent.
MR. BLANE HARRIS:

Um-hmm.

THE COURT: If you were a juror, could you go into
this trial presuming they are innocent?
MR. BLANE HARRIS:

Definitely.

THE COURT: Now, was there anything else, Mr.
Winchester?
MR.

WINCHESTER:

Not here.

MR. HUMMEL: How long have you been back from your
mission?
MR. BLANE HARRIS:
year.

I -- see, June 22nd of last

I have come -MR. HUMMEL: All right.

I don't have any other

questions.
THE COURT: Okay.

Thanks so ever much.

Either one of you challenge?
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MR. HUMMEL: No.
MR. WINCHESTER:
THE COURT;

No.

And neither one of you challenge

Miss Flatberg?
MR. HUMMEL: No.
MR. WINCHESTER:
THE COURT:

No.

Nor the ones above her on the list?

MR. WINCHESTER:
MR. HUMMEL:

Correct.

I believe that's correct.

Yes, that

is correct.
THE COURT:
MR. TULLIS:

All right.

Okay.

Thank you.

I had a couple of things to add.

Jim

Cropf, his son and me were best friends at one time. He's
a witness.
THE COURT:
MR. TULLIS:
THE COURT:
MS.

TULLIS:

Okay. Now, you are Mr. Tullis?
Um-hmm.
Okay.

You were best friends with?

.

Jim Cropf' s son. And I know him.

Then Bret Smith, me and him were buddies in high school.
THE COURT:

Who is he?

MR. WINCHESTER:

Former Kanab City police officer.

He's a witness for the state.
THE COURT:

Okay.

So I 'm clear on that.

I have a

lot of buddies in high school.
MS.

TULLIS:

Just wanted to let you now.
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THE COURT:

We have 35.

Now, let's see, how many have I got?

So I have plenty.

Any other challenges for

cause, let's deal wit:h right now.
MR. WINCHESTER: Not here.

I have no reason to

keep Don Tay].or around unless we have already resolved
that.
THE COURT:
MR. HUMMEL:
THE COURT:

Okay.

I'll excuse him.

I agree with that.
Now, first, let's go down through.

Scott Johnson.
MR. HUMMEL:
THE COURT:
MR. HUMMEL:

He's not related to anybody, right?
No.
Okay.

So I don't have any for cause

against him.
THE COURT:
MR. HUMMEL:

law enforcement.

All right.

Now, I have Wendy Harris.

She's got a lot of involvement with

But I don't have any specific for cause

against her.
THE COURT:

She is a brother or sister to Blane

Harris.
MR. HUMMEL:

Yeah.

That's the -- see, that's the

same concern I had. We can't ask them if there would be an
influence brother to sister.
THE COURT:
MR. HUMMEL:

I did ask them.
Did you?
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THE COURT:

Um-hmm.

I did on the stand.

They

both assured me.
THE

BAILIFF

MR. HUMMEL:
THE COURT:
MR. HUMMEL:

Sister-in-law.
So -- oh, it's a sister-in-law.
Sister-in-law, yeah..
I don't have any specific against

either one of them.
THE COURT:

The same with Rhonda Flatberg?

MR. HUMMEL:

No.

THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. HUMMEL:

No.

THE COURT:
MR. HUMMEL:

Marc Hunter?

All right.
No»

Orval Heaton?

And I really don't have any

notes about him.
THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. HUMMEL:

No.

THE COURT:
MR. HUMMEL:
THE COURT:

Shirl Spencer?

Justin Jones?
He's the rancher, right?

No.

Frances Jacobs.

MR. WINCHESTER: Judge, let me disclose something
on Frances Jacobs.

rhere has been a dispute in this county

over a road that leads to her house.

People that own the

property ahead of he r would like to close the road off.
Kane County wants to keep the road open publicly.

Kane

County has been sued by the people in front of her.

Their
148
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about for cause.

And you said you wouldn't --

THE COURT:

anyway.

Well, we won't get down to him

Okay.

If we are not goi.ng to get down that far, thenL

Sharon Wetze]
MR. HUMMEL:
THE COURT:
MR. HUMMEL:

No problem.
So on the whole list -I just have one question.

McCrory , what's the number you have for him?

On

Is he 50 or

|

51. "' '.
THE COURT:
MR.

HUMMEL:

THE COURT:

Fifty-one on my list.

But --

Okay.
Now, so the only one you have

challenged for cause is Donnie Riddle?
MR. HUMMEL:
THE COURT:

that then.
others.

The only remaining one, yes.
All right.

Well, I'm going to grant

So we've got, we are stipulated on all the
I

Question is , how many shall I have come back?

think I 've got to let them go to lunch now.
THE CLERK:

Some of them are getting sick.

THE COURT:

Yes.

MR.

WINCHESTER:

First, page 10.
Is the defense going to have four

peremptcDries or four for each client?
MR. HUMMEL:
THE COURT:

court.

Don t I get four for each client:>
Well, it's discretionary with the

But you have one lawyer and a common defense.

i^i
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do this, if you want.
to go first.

I'll give you five, but require you

If you want, one extra one.

MR. HUMMEL: How about six, and I do them both?
THE COURT: Well, you know, if there is some
reason, but you passed all of them for cause.
MR. HUMMEL: You have - - a for cause and a
peremptory are completely different.
THE COURT: You know, the rule says you get four.
But each side gets four.

Where there are multiple

defendants I can require that they exercise them in unison,
or I can grant additional one.

But where you have the same

lawyer on a common defense, I have a hard time justifying
too much of a variation.

If you want to stipulate to

something else, I'll allow it.
MR. HUMMEL: Six.
MR. WINCHESTER:

And I do the first 2.

Fine.

THE COURT: All right.

Stipulated.

So we are

going to end up, we need 10 and 10. We need 20?
12 on this first page.
Geiger.

I've got

Twenty-two takes me down through

Suppose I have that group come back after lunch.
MR. WINCHESTER: McCrory we excused.
MR. HUMMEL: Maybe we ought to read them real

fast.
THE COURT: There is 21 to there.
MR. HUMMEL: Shall I read what I have and see if
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1
2

they are
THE COURT: If I can get 21. Twenty-four come

3

back after lunch.

That gets me down to through Budd

4

Chavis. And we'll excuse the last page.

5

MR. HUMMEL: Okay.

6

MR. WINCHESTER:

7

THE COURT: Then something should happen over

8

lunch hour.

11
12

We got 24 coming back.

THE CLERK: Something as in a settlement?

9
10

THE COURT: No.
after lunch.

MR. WINCHESTER: What do you anticipate the
afternoon being?

14

have several witnesses.

15

until tomorrow morning.

you want.

18

peremptories.

20
21
22
23
24
25

Unfortunately, I have miscalculated and I
Maybe I need to send several home

THE COURT: Well, I'm willing to stay as long as

17

19

I'll have these 24 come back

Then we'll exercise the peremptories.

13

16

Okay.

It won't take us very long to get through these

MR. WINCHESTER: Then we have some jury
instructions, opening arguments.
MR. HUMMEL: Are you inclined to read only your
stock jury instructions or --.
THE COURT: I am.

At the beginning I'll just read

those stocks.
MR. HUMMEL: Plus the information.
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COLIN R. WINCHESTER [4696]
KANE COUNTY ATTORNEY
J. CHRISTIAN RASMUSSEN [8267]
DEPUTY KANE COUNTY ATTORNEY
34 North Main Street
Kanab, Utah 84 741
Telephone: (435) 644-5278
Facsimile: (435) 644-8156

****.
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IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR KANE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

ORDER DENYING
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL

v.
Case No. 981600101
ROBERT BELTRAN,
ASSIGNED JUDGE:

K. L. McIFF

Defendant.

This matter came before the Court on November 22, 2000, and
again on December 22, 2000, pursuant to Defendant's motion for a
new trial.

The State of Utah was represented by the Kane County

Attorney, Colin R. Winchester.

The Defendant was present and was

represented by counsel, John E. Hummel.

Defendant's motion was

based on two grounds: first, that juror Justin Jones was not a
resident of Kane County at the time of his jury service in this

STATE OF UTAH V. ROBERT BELTRAN
Case No. 981600101
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matter; and second, that the prosecutor's spouse, Rebecca
Winchester, had engaged in conversations with one or more of the
jurors during trial recesses.
Defendant had submitted affidavits in support of the
allegations.

Defendant proffered motor vehicle records which

showed that one or more of Mr. Jones's vehicles was registered in
the State of Arizona.

The parties stipulated that Mr. Jones held

a valid Utah driver license, and'that he was registered to vote
in Utah.

The Defendant called juror Wendy Harris, alternate

juror Cheryl Brown, and Mrs. Winchester.
BASED ON THE FOREGOING, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND
DECREED AS FOLLOWS:
1.

Justin Jones was a resident of Kane County at the time

of his jury service in this matter.

His residence was in Kanab,

Utah, though he worked on a ranch in Arizona.

Based on the

evidence before the Court, there is insufficient evidence to
grant Defendant=s motion on this issue.
2.

Regarding the alleged conversation between juror Wendy

Harris and Mrs. Winchester, Mrs. Winchester testified that there
may have been one brief conversation, amounting to no more than
common courtesy, at or near a soda vending machine.

STATE OF UTAH v. ROBERT BELTRAN
Case No. 981600101
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Ms. Harris

testified that she did not recall having had any conversation
with Mrs. Winchester during the trial, and that she did not know
Mrs. Winchester at the time of the trial.

Both Mrs. Winchester

and Ms. Harris denied discussing the trial or anything related
thereto.

Based on the evidence before the Court, there is

insufficient evidence to grant Defendant=s motion as a result of
the conversation between Ms. Harris and Mrs. Winchester.
3.

Regarding the alleged conversation between alternate

juror Cheryl Brown and Mrs. Winchester, Mrs. Winchester testified
that she engaged in one conversation with Ms. Brown during a
recess, and that the conversation was limited to a discussion
regarding a community musical production in which both were
involved.

Ms. Brown testified that there may have been more than

one such conversation, but that any conversation with Mrs.
Winchester during the trial was limited to issues other than the
trial.

Based on the evidence before the Court, there is

insufficient evidence to grant Defendant=s motion as a result of
the conversation between Ms. Brown and Mrs. Winchester.
4.

Regarding the alleged comment from among a group of

women, one of whom was identified as Mrs. Winchester, at the rear
of the courtroom, in which an unidentified woman commented that

STATE OF UTAH v. ROBERT BELTRAN
Case No. 981600101
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she was confused about an expert witness's testimony, there is
insufficient evidence to support that any juror overheard the
comment.

Based on the evidence before the Court, there is

insufficient evidence to grant Defendant=s motion as a result of
the comment.
5.

Based on the above findings, the Court denies the

motion for a new trial.
6.

Defendant shall remain free on bail pending further

hearing on February 16, 2001 at 9:30 a.m.

DATED this 20th day of February, 2001.

BY THE COURT:
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